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ABSTRACT 
 
Global political, economic and security dynamics are in flux. The purported decline of 
America, along with the ascension of Russia and China – among other emerging 
economies – is altering the rules of the international system. The theme of American 
decline and the rise of China and Russia as possible threats to American hegemony is a 
topic laden with much heated debates. America’s tendency to overstretch its military and 
economic expansion beyond its national borders, along with the rise of dynamic and 
competitive economies across the world, undermined the country’s global stature and 
unleashed a global struggle for power with the likes of China and Russia. These countries 
are balancing against US hegemony both regionally and internationally. This thesis 
examines the theme of American decline and the factors affecting this decline. It assesses 
the rise of China and Russia as potential competitors that can balance against American 
hegemony within the framework of their mutual interests and alliances. 
Keywords: American Decline, China, Russia, Balance of Power, Hegemony 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Introduction: 
The global political, economic, and security structure is changing. Unipolarity is 
no longer possible, and perhaps unacceptable. The arguable decline of America, along 
with the ascension of Russia and China – among other emerging economies – is altering 
the rules of the international system. The first decade of the 21
st
 Century marked a 
significant transformation in the global distribution of world power since the end of the 
Cold War. The fall of the Soviet Union had paved the way for a decade of American 
global dominance. The United States (US) possessed enough resources that allowed it to 
emerge as a global hegemon and exert its power and influence internationally. Theorists 
argued that US hegemonic power produced significant stability in the international 
system (Beeson & Broome, 2010).  
Mark Beeson and Andre Broome (2010) contend that the ‘hegemonic stability 
theory,’ influenced by Charles Kindleberger’s study of the Great Depression, deemed the 
presence of a hegemonic leader as necessary and beneficial to the well-being of global 
economic stability. However, they claim that hegemonic dominance may possibly 
generate global instability. They regarded US hegemony as the primary source of global 
economic – and one might add political and security – instability (Beeson & Broome, 
2010).  
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The literature on hegemonic stability exposes a general tendency by any given 
hegemon to take advantage of its dominance. This generates a wave of resistance in 
which other capable states rise to challenge the hegemon’s supremacy by attempting to 
displace it or balance against its power (Walt, 2005). Consequently, a zero-sum game of 
interminable power struggles arises, and eventually culminates in an unavoidable conflict 
that marks the rise of a new power and the downfall of another (Beeson & Broome, 
2010). The notion that every hegemon will be challenged at a given point in time gives 
rise to the theory of balancing against power and/or threat. The presence of three global 
resilient opponents nowadays within the compounds of the abovementioned struggle 
gives rise to a security dilemma competition between them that compels them to balance 
against each other to ensure global dominance, maintain regional supremacy, or seek both 
simultaneously.  
The beginning of American hegemonic decline may have been triggered by two 
unwinnable wars against Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 representing the 
pinnacle of American power under President Georges W. Bush, along with a massive 
economic crisis that originated in the US. Stephen Walt go as far as arguing that glimpses 
of resistance to American hegemony started to surface in the middle 1990s as France, 
Germany, and other countries expressed their anxiety vis-à-vis American unilateralism. 
America’s tendency to overstretch its military and economic expansion beyond its 
national borders, along with the rise of dynamic and competitive economies – notably 
that of China – unsettled the country’s global stature and generated a global struggle for 
power with the likes of China and Russia that are likely to balance against US hegemony. 
However, this does not necessarily imply the existence or possible emergence of a 
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bandwagon effect given that both states have separate regional agendas, despite shared 
foreign policy interests.   
 
1.2. Challenges to American Hegemony: 
Addressing the theme of American decline requires an examination of the 
challenges affecting decline. Presently, the rise of China and Russia is regarded as a 
major component in studies on global challenges to American hegemony. The present 
struggle for power between the US, China, and Russia can be explained by 
Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism. Mersheimer contends that states are destined 
to struggle for power perpetually within the framework of an anarchic international 
system (Snyder, 2002). This power struggle compels states to bolster their security by 
continuously attempting to amplify their power. 
Talks about American decline are shadowed by corroborating instances such as 
the Sino-Russian double veto on the Arab League’s Security Council resolution on Syria. 
The veto takes the Security Council out of the equation and represents a drastic change of 
tactics by China and Russia, seeing as both countries had a tendency to tactically abstain 
from voting on resolutions related to the Arab-Israeli conflict and Libya (Williams, 
2012). Furthermore, it indicates a balance against American power and influence that 
might be occurring within the Security Council and globally.  Other indicators suggest 
that China and Russia could represent a threat to US hegemony in Asia and the Middle 
East.  
In this respect much has been written recently about Russia’s endeavor to restore 
its influence in the Middle East, mainly due to geopolitical, cultural, and economic 
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interests (Kreutz, 2002). Russian President Vladimir Putin announced his country’s 
rejection of American unipolarity publically during his speech at the 4th Munich Security 
Conference in 2007. He called for the establishment of a new global security structure 
that balances between the interests of all (Blanche, 2010). Apparently, Russia would be 
merely aiming to balance and not displace the US from the Middle East as America’s 
presence in the region arguably protects Russian interests from Al-Qaeda and its allies 
(Katz, 2008).  
Putin’s declarations, along with Russia’s efforts to reassert itself in the region, 
indicate Moscow’s willingness to recover the nation’s great-power status and balance 
against the US (Blanche, 2010). In fact, the Russian Federation is arguably America’s 
main geopolitical rival given its active role Syria, Iran, and the Arab-Israeli conflict 
(Stein, 2012). As such, we could very well be witnessing the reigniting of a new Cold 
War between the US and Russia (Abou Ismail, 2011). However, Roland Dannreuther 
contends that a return to a Cold War apparatus between the US and Russia is highly 
improbable given the existence of several political and cultural differences between the 
Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia (Dannreuther, 2009).  
Understanding the current nature of Russian-American relations and the challenge 
posed by Russia in the Middle East requires an examination of the ongoing Syrian Crisis, 
Russia’s relations with what Talal Nizameddin called in 2008 the “Iran-Syria-Hezbollah 
Nexus,” and the effect of Russian domestic change under Putin on foreign policy in the 
Middle East (Freedman, 2002). Scholars, including Boris Dolgov, highlighted the impact 
of the 2011 Syrian Revolution on present-day international relations, but many 
overlooked Russia’s revival in global politics due to contemporary events such as the 
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European debt crisis, the earthquake and tsunami in Japan, and the emphasis on 
America’s role in the so-called “Arab Spring” (Palmer, 2011). In reality, the “Arab 
Spring” might have possibly provided Russia with new prospects for strengthening its 
influence in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region (Baev, 2011). This thesis 
explores these issues and sheds the light on Russo-American relations at times during 
which Washington “has a distinct set of friends and foes, but Moscow has relatively good 
relations with all governments and most major opposition movements in the region” 
(Katz, 2008).  
Along with Russia comes China. Both states are not bandwagoning to balance 
against American power, but are simply aligning on the basis of shared regional interests.  
The People’s Republic of China has had a long history of cooperation with the Soviet 
Union, sustained with the Russian Federation despite times of discord between their 
leaders (Borodavkin, 2009). In fact, many scholars and diplomats argue that Russia and 
China are interdependent in terms of strengths and prosperity (Razov, 2012). While 
Western Christianity represented a challenge to Russia’s Orthodoxy and sense of identity, 
China’s neutrality with respect to religious identity played a constructive role in shaping 
Russo-Chinese relations (Curanović, 2012). Realists have argued that states will seek 
power constantly to reinforce their security and bolster their position within the 
international system. As stated by James MacHaffie, one way of achieving this objective 
is the recourse to alliance building. While China has not been very successful in growing 
long-standing alliances, it has thrived at cultivating a deep state of cooperation with 
Russia (MacHaffie, 2011). This, according to MacHaffie, is caused by attempts from both 
nations to balance against American power and threat.  
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Nevertheless, Walt suggests that Washington’s good fortune is likely to continue 
due to slight advantages over others, including economic diversity and territorial security. 
Robert Kagan also refers to America’s geopolitical position as being advantageous with 
relation to potential peer competitors, notably China that is surrounded by watchful 
neighbors (Freedland, 2012). In other words, both authors seem to be suggesting that one 
country alone cannot challenge the US. In that respect, the rise of the BRICS (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, and South Africa) economies could constitute a challenge to US 
influence around the world, while explaining America’s forthcoming and unavoidable 
decline. Thus, the challenge to US hegemony ought to be analyzed within the framework 
of an alliance that has been emerging between Russia and China. Current struggles 
between Washington, Beijing, and Moscow revolve around economic interests linked to 
natural resources in areas of strategic geopolitical location such as Africa and the Middle 
East. Accordingly, the nature of struggles requires alliance-building in contested regions 
in order to gain leverage over them.   
It is extremely difficult to describe the nature of current Sino-American relations. 
The US seems to be cautiously retracting from the Middle East and building a new 
strategy that focuses on reinforcing its presence in Asia in order to prevent Chinese 
hegemony. Sino-American relations remain very thorny and filled with suspicion. What 
is certain is that Russia has been regaining the prestige that once made it America’s 
fiercest opponent, and that China is the first non-Western power – since Japan (1867-
1912) – that possesses the potential to influence and/or reshape the existing global order 
(Chellaney, 2012). 
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1.3. Research Questions: 
Assessing America’s global status today requires understanding the differences 
between the challenges posed by China and Russia now, and the threat posed by the 
Soviet Union previously. Unlike the Cold War era that necessitated active military 
reinforcement and large defense spending, the challenges rising from facing China and 
Russia today are mostly economy-oriented given the struggle to dominate areas of 
strategic geopolitical significance such as Syria. These areas are either rich in gas and oil, 
or considered fundamental to their flow through pipeline transportation. It is extremely 
difficult to describe the nature of current Sino-American and Russo-American relations. 
It is arguable that we are currently enduring the initial stages of a new cold war between 
the US on one side, and a Sino-Russian camp on the other. However, the idea that the 
notion of a new cold war is far-fetched is also plausible.  
Accordingly, finding a common ground between both arguments is of extreme 
importance to the understanding of the current state of international affairs. It will enable 
diplomats and academics to forecast accurately the future of global affairs and the global 
power structure, which is fundamental for effective and constructive policymaking. This 
thesis attempts to answer two questions of significant contemporary importance: 1) is 
American power and influence really declining?, and 2) are China and Russia currently 
able to constitute a balance to US hegemony, in the Middle East and Asia respectively? 
The first question examines the theme of American decline and analyzes the contributing 
factors therein. It assesses the notions of power and influence, underlying the link 
between them, in order to understand America’s stature within the newly emerging global 
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system. The second question investigates the regional political and economic factors that 
make China and Russia challengers to American hegemony. 
 
1.4. Methodology: 
The main questions and points of interest the thesis will address stem from a 
curiosity toward the modern implications of balancing on the current world order. This 
research gathers and analyzes relevant literature in order to respond to the 
abovementioned questions and gain further insight on the possible effects of balancing on 
the existing world order. This thesis relies on an analysis of secondary sources related to 
the topics of decline and balancing. It examines the cases of the US, China, and Russia in 
order to investigate the relation between American decline and the revival of China and 
Russia. Accordingly, this thesis explores the premises of decline and revival, and the 
challenges that both Beijing and Moscow can constitute in Asia and the Middle East.  
The present research seeks to articulate several of the key notions on balancing, 
American decline, and the potential for Chinese and Russian challenge to American 
power and influence. It focuses specifically on the factors that might be contributing to 
America’s decline, and the elements of power that could allow China and Russia to 
contest American hegemony regionally, and/or globally. The nature of the proposed 
methodology for this research provides a theory-based orienting concept that constitutes a 
rubric by which the topic is analyzed and interpreted. This undertaking comes at a time of 
multiple and intersecting global struggles affecting the existing world order. As such, its 
relevance is quite empirical.  
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Given that China and Russia are leaning toward the kind of mutual cooperation – 
noticeable by their synchronized stances on the Syrian Crisis – that might eventually 
counterbalance American power in Asia and the Middle East, observing the notion of 
American decline within the context of Sino-American and Russo-American relations is 
of significant importance to the understanding of the current status quo in global affairs. 
To do so, the thesis examines carefully three cases: a) The case of American decline; b) 
the case of Russian challenge in the Middle East; and c) The case of Chinese challenge in 
Asia. 
 
1.5. Map of the Thesis: 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. The next chapter examines the debate on 
American hegemony and decline. The third chapter discusses the revival of Russia and 
the challenge it posed to the US in the Middle East. The fourth chapter examines the rise 
of China and its confrontation with the US in Asia. The fifth and final chapter spells out 
the theoretical findings of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
AMERICAN DECLINE 
 
2.1. Introduction: 
One of the main debates of the last decade was that on American decline. The 
debate took, and is still taking place in tandem with the rise of the BRICS economies and 
the associated challenges posed by China and Russia to US hegemony. Amid talks about 
American decline, Stephen Walt contends that the US should readjust its foreign policy to 
focus less on America’s “global responsibilities” and more on its “national interests”. In 
contrast, Robert Kagan refutes arguments about American decline and emphasizes the 
need for America to maintain its responsibilities toward other states. Kagan believes that 
the main characteristics of the current world order – democracy, prosperity, and great-
power peace – have depended greatly on American power and influence. Accordingly, he 
suggests that this international liberal order will likely falter should American power 
decline. However, Kagan overlooks the crucial internal problems cited by scholars who 
are concerned by American decline – including, but not limited to “political gridlock at 
home, falling education scores, lowered social mobility and most important, a ballooning 
deficit” (Kakutani, 2012).  
Zbigniew Brzezinski was also among those who addressed the notion of 
American decline. He contends that current changes in the distribution of global power 
require an assertive and responsive American role instead of a “retreat into an ignorant 
garrison-state mentality or wallow in self-righteous cultural hedonism” (Brzezinski, 
2012, p. 2). Brzezinski goes as far as claiming that the absence of a revitalized America 
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from the international community would likely stall any progress on highly important 
issues related to social well-being and human survival (Brzezinski, 2012). That being 
said, understanding whether America is declining or not requires a thourough 
examination of the factors that might contribute to such decline, notably  the dynamics of 
foreign policymaking in Washington, the state of the American economy, and the rise of 
the BRICS economies. 
This chapter investigates the debate on American hegemony and decline. It 
discusses the nature of threats that currently face the US, and studies the economic factor 
related to the debate on American decline. The chapter also examines the status of 
American power to detrmine whether the US is declining or simply strategically 
retreating.  
 
2.2. The Nature of Threats: 
The notion of “threat” is recurrent in the shaping and assessment of American 
foreign policy ever since World War I, to the extent that threat is deemed crucial to the 
existence of America. The nature of threat has evolved over time, notably in the post-9/11 
era, and Washington has continuously found itself mobilizing the American people for 
lengthy and costly wars – such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq under the Bush Jr. 
administration, and Barack Obama’s current campaign to legitimize military action in 
Syria. These costly wars have been deemed by academics as chief instigators of an 
alleged American decline. Consequently, it is important to start first with an explanation 
of the process of war mobilization in the US in order to realize the reason why American 
wars of choice affect the nation’s global stature. 
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Walt (2012) insists that Washington mobilizes the American people to support US 
“wars of choice” that do not revolve around the defense of US territory and strategic 
interests abroad. In “How Do you Sustain Public Support for Wars of Choice?,” Walt 
contends that policymakers resort to cunning tactics – threat-inflating, task-deflating, and 
concealing – to serve that interest, and concludes that these wars should be avoided for 
the sake of America. He points that prior to both World Wars, Americans supported wars 
only when they acknowledged the existence of a threat to vital US interests. That was 
also the case for the American policy of containment during the Cold War (Walt, 2012). 
The situation is different now, however, and Walt suggests that the US and its allies 
currently face non-existential threats from “minor powers”, as opposed to the kind of 
“imminent threat” presented by major powers such as the Soviet Union. In fact, Walt 
contends that the US itself constitutes an existential threat to governments that do not 
conform to its policies – cases in point are those of Slobodan Milošević, Muammar 
Gaddafi, Manuel Noriega, and Saddam Hussein. 
 Walt also suggests that Washington justifies military action to taxpayers by 
resorting to three synchronized tactics –“threat-inflations”, “task-deflation”, and 
“concealment”– that will undoubtedly produce negative long-term implications on the 
American economy and the public perception of America globally. First, policymakers 
employ threat-inflation to magnify the imminence and dangers of moderate military 
challenges – as in the cases of Iraq and Iran – and subsequently use task-deflation to 
downplay the cost and length of intervention. Later, policymakers turn to concealment to 
hide the outcome of wars from taxpayers. Wrongfully adopted by both the Clinton and 
the Bush Jr. administrations in the buildup for interventions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, 
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and Iraq, Barack Obama seems to be assuming the same path, but to no avail. Walt 
concludes that task-deflation and concealment often implicate Washington in protracted 
and costly commitments over “relatively minor interests” that drastically unwind public 
support for US policies and degrade American influence abroad. This specific outcome 
sets the ground for discussions on American decline and balancing against American 
hegemony. A less influential America allows for more influential opponents, such as 
China and Russia. 
 
2.3. Power and Decline: Is America Declining? 
The notion of “American decline” was a recurring theme in the 2012 presidential 
elections. Both candidates – Barack Obama and Mitt Romney – resorted to a political 
dialogue aimed at convincing prospective voters about their ability to reinvigorate 
“American resurgence” amid fears of the irreversible downfall of US supremacy. In 
2012, Walt argues that despite being unfounded, this fear has been recurring since World 
War II. Walt (2012) contends that American supremacy has arguably been the 
consequence of good fortune from which the US is still reaping the benefits. Kagan 
shares a similar point of view. He asserts that the US was never supreme and notes that 
“in every single decade since the end of World War II Americans have worried about 
their declining influence and looked nervously as other powers seemed to be rising at 
their expense” (Kakutani, 2012). 
Kagan posits that talks about American decline are rooted in a “nostalgic fallacy” 
portraying an American golden past since World War II (Freedland, 2012). Such 
arguments could be drawn back to 1788 when Patrick Henry lamented the Republic’s fall 
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from “when the American spirit was in its youth” (Freedland, 2012). Brzezinski voices a 
similar argument, suggesting that the sort of periodic pessimism that is now being elicited 
about America’s global stature is in fact well-worn. He adds that the US proved to be 
resilient on several occasion, and has surmounted several periods of anxiety during which 
many anticipated its demise – notably under the Eisenhower administration, when the 
Soviets launched the Sputnik, and under the Nixon administration after the failure in 
Vietnam (Brzezinski, 2012). Brzezinski also notes that America remains currently 
unrivaled due to the inability of competitors to match its comprehensive global power.  
This power is composed of four dimensions: “1. global military reach; 2. global 
economic impact; 3. global cultural-ideological appeal; and, cumulatively as a result of 
the foregoing, 4. global political muscle” (Brzezinski, 1993, p. 87). 
In turn, Walt points to the difficulty of measuring the national power of a given 
state due to the lack of a specific measurement tool. He contends that such an undertaking 
becomes even more difficult when one comes to assess the concept of influence. He links 
the notion of power to that of capability, and argues that the possession of extensive 
power does not necessarily enable one state to exert its influence over another. In other 
words, and in many situations, strong states do not possess the adequate tools needed to 
determine the course of events and compel weaker states to advance their strategic 
interests. The author postulates that fears by Americans over a decline in US supremacy 
in the world are unjustified as the US was never a real world hegemon. He makes the 
case that in some historical instances, “a combination of good fortune and skillful policy 
put the US in a highly unusual position of primacy” (Walt, 2012). In other words, US 
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supremacy had been the mere outcome of its competitors’ weakness, and its arguable 
decline could only be a natural consequence of their recovery.  
Brzezinski also contends that since the 1990s, when America had become the first 
real global force, power became globally dispersed. The emerging European Union (EU), 
along with Russia, China, India, and Japan all developed into contenders scheming for a 
position. Brzezinski contends that “the emergence of a volatile phenomenon: the 
worldwide political awakening of populations until recently politically passive or 
repressed” in Central and Eastern Europe and the Arab world magnifies this dispersal of 
power (Brzezinski, 2012, p. 26) 
Conducting US foreign policy would have been fairly easy had Washington 
confined itself to the principle of defending the American people against significant 
threats and nurturing sustained economic development instead of attempting to undertake 
very difficult, irrational, and trivial objectives such as exporting US democracy to 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and pressurizing Iran into thwarting nuclear enrichment activities 
(Walt, 2012). Nevertheless, Walt seems to suggest that Washington’s good fortune is 
likely to continue due to slight advantages over others, including economic diversity and 
territorial security. In this respect, Kagan refers to America’s geopolitical position as an 
advantage of which its potential peer competitors, notably China – surrounded by 
watchful neighbors – are deprived (Freedland, 2012). Brzezinski (2012) emphasizes the 
indispensability of America in an increasingly unstable world, even in a global order in 
which it is no longer a hegemonic giant. He argues that America’s role continues to be 
crucial to the promotion of “a larger and more vital West” (p. 4) that could embrace 
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Turkey and a “truly democratizing Russia” (p. 185) while simultaneously playing the 
balancing and conciliating role in Asia. 
Walt, Kagan, and Brzezinski adopt different patterns of analysis while addressing 
the notion of American decline, but they seemingly agree on the idea that decline in itself 
is exaggerated. Using Walt’s analysis, one could make the case that the rise of the BRICS 
economies constitutes a challenge – but not great enough – to US influence around the 
world, while explaining America’s forthcoming and unavoidable decline. Accordingly, in 
spite of having a slight advantage over others in terms of economic diversity and 
territorial security, Washington’s primary quest is not to regain an unfounded and lost 
supremacy, but rather to find a comparative advantage that would make the US a 
supreme power instead. As Pankaj Mishra (2012) deems America’s decline to be 
preordained, a secondary quest would be seeking to create a long-lasting gap with rising 
competitors that would at least postpone an unavoidable decline. 
 
2.3.1. The Economic Factor 
The economic factor constitutes an essential element in the analysis of American 
decline in the twenty-first century. Long and unnecessary wars have depleted the 
American economy, making it vulnerable in the face of rising economic powers such as 
China and Russia. Edward Luce states that current US President Barack Obama believes 
that the next four years will witness the revival of American economy. The author 
suggests that the rhetoric about America’s economic recovery hinges on “sobering 
assumptions” rather than certainties (Luce, 2012). The problem is that such premeditated 
expectations are anticipated amidst unrelenting declines in US unit labor cost and median 
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income. In fact, the latest Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013 published in 
September by the World Economic Forum indicated a severe decline in US 
competitiveness for the fourth year in a row – the US is now ranked seventh by the World 
Economic Forum in the 2012 ranking of economic competitiveness. (Schwab, 2012).  
Luce also suggests that America’s share of global income has fallen from 36 per 
cent to 31 per cent between 1969 and 2000 – numbers cited in the International Monetary 
Fund’s World Economic Outlook. During the first decade of the twenty first century, 
America had witnessed a further reduction of 7.9 per cent, more than what it lost in 
thirty-one years (Luce, 2012). When compared to another rising power and potential 
competitor, one can notice that China’s economy was flourishing simultaneously and 
steadily – China accounted for 41 per cent of world income by 2012 (Luce, 2012). 
Referring to Arvind Subramanian, Luce suggests that at this rate China would upset 
American preeminence and surpass the US within twelve years. This contradicts 
Brzezinski’s claim that America is still unrivalled at all levels. 
 Despite the harsh criticism directed toward the key principles of neoliberal 
economics, Kagan maintains that capitalism looks like it is “discrediting itself” and 
confirms the liberal economic order as being “in everyone’s interest” (Freedland, 2012). 
Further evidence corroborating America’s economic struggles can be taken from the 
debate on sequestration and its role in both US fiscal year budgets for 2013 and 2014, 
amid incoherent financial policies, cuts on the budget baseline, and a rise in entitlement 
spending that arguably pose further challenges to defense planning and spending, national 
security, and strategic planning (Cordesman & Shelala II, 2013). The idea of 
sequestration was first introduced by the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
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Control Act of 1985 under the Regan administration in order to balance the federal 
budget by 1991 (Cornell University Law School, 1985). Sequestration comes into play in 
the event of a rise in the budget deficit. Through sequestration, mandatory spending cuts 
are applied to the federal budget in order to reduce deficits and limit the damages that 
could be caused by increased annual budget deficits. Currently, the Congressional Budget 
Office, the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of Defense, and the 
military have expressed concerns about potential damages to security and strategic 
planning in the event of cuts on defense spending (Cordesman & Shelala II, 2013).  
Luce contests Kagan’s notion of American exceptionalism that, according to the 
author, portrays decline as a matter of choice. Kagan refutes the claim that America is 
currently in relative decline, arguing that such a premise lacks supporting economic 
evidence (Kakutani, 2012). However, he asserts that certain politicians and policymakers 
are continuously hoping for America’s decline. According to Luce, Kagan’s argument is 
an allusion Barack Obama who negotiated a reduction in US defense budget and adopted 
a foreign policy of appeasement. Luce’s article seems to suggest that overlooking the 
ominous economic facts of the past decade, and concentrating on propagating illusory 
statements about America’s supremacy as being reliant on military superiority will only 
aggravate problems. 
Despite divergent views about the state of America’s economy, “bad governance, 
macroeconomic instability, and declining infrastructure” emerge as obvious defects that 
will likely undermine the recovery process (Luce, 2012). In this regard, Brzezinski talks 
about the faltering and unstable financial system that benefits “greedy Wall Street 
speculators” in the US (Freedland, 2012). As Jonathan Freedland asserts, Brzezinski 
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accentuates the need for reform to guarantee growth and to nurture the internal “social 
consensus and democratic stability” that is crucial for the US to be a force abroad.  
Whether America is declining or not is remains difficult to assess. Certain 
political and economic factors might prove or disprove the claim. What is certain is that 
America’s role within a seemingly new emerging world order is evolving, but in what 
direction? After examining the notion of decline, the next section will address this 
question by assessing the dynamics of retreat while focusing on the Middle East as a case 
in point. 
 
2.4. Power and Decline: Is America Retreating? 
 The literature on American decline suggests that the theme is still disputed among 
academic circles. The majority agrees that decline is imminent due to the rise of global 
competitors such as Russia, China, and other economic powerhouses. However, a select 
number of analysts continue to believe that America could possibly evade a looming 
decline by strategically readjusting its foreign policy. This is where a potential tactical 
retreat from regions such as the Middle East would come in handy. 
 Mishra argues that US involvement in the Middle East is expected to decrease in 
the coming years due to Washington’s irregular policies that have alienated many people 
in the region against it, and the downfall of its regional allies following the popular Arab 
uprisings. He contends that the new elected governments will likely be more responsive 
to popular sentiments and demands (Mishra, 2012). Walt contends that regime change in 
the Middle East will bring about several problems in the years to come. As proven by the 
experience of Afghanistan and Iraq, it will be very difficult for Washington to mend 
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those problems with intervention due to differences in political culture. From a defensive 
realist perspective, Walt suggests that in order to ensure a sound recovery, Washington 
ought to rethink its policies and learn from its previous failures that resulted in wasted 
lives and money (Walt, 2012). Russia and China have already taken advantage of 
America’s demonized image in the Middle East by adopting a more assertive foreign 
policy in the region. With two double-vetoes in the United Nation’s Security Council 
(UNSC), the Syrian crisis provides clear indications that Moscow and Beijing are capable 
of balancing against Washington. 
 Walt claims that despite its failures, the US still retains the most power globally, 
and will do so for many years to come. Nevertheless, its global influence is waning, 
forcing policymakers to adjust Washington’s strategies to fit within a more modest role 
internationally. Accordingly, efforts should be directed toward emphasizing America’s 
strengths instead of undermining them (Walt, 2012). However, Brzezinski argues that a 
policy adjustment leading to passivity and non-engagement would likely result in global 
anarchy and the failure of the international system to prevent conflicts due to America’s 
unwillingness or inability to “protect states it once considered, for national interest and/ 
or doctrinal reasons, worthy of its engagement” (Brzezinski, 2012, p. 102). 
In response to this argument, scholars, including Walt, do not advocate American 
isolationism, but a mere adjustment of American foreign policy, along with a 
reprioritization of interests for the benefit of America. In other words, they advocate 
realism. This idea is consistent with John Mearsheimer’s theory of offshore balancing – 
which can be mistaken for isolationism – that Walt considers a “cost-efficient way to 
influence geopolitics” abroad (Walt, 2011). Walt argues that, in order to work, offshore 
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balancing needs to be accompanied by astute diplomatic engagement in key areas, and a 
commitment to intervene in those areas if and when the balance of power breaks down.    
However, Walt objects to Mishra’s use of the word “retreat” in his article. He 
contends that Americans should not look at their nation’s new moderate role as a 
“retreat” but rather as a “farsighted and voluntary adjustment to new conditions and 
strategic priorities” instead. Hence, Washington would not be seen as being expelled 
from the Middle East, but as voluntarily choosing to relocate its resources toward more 
constructive areas. The author suggests that assessing this adjustment as a “retreat” would 
only reinforce neoconservative hardline policies, waste more resources through defense 
spending, and obstruct the necessary phase of adjustment (Walt, 2012). Making these 
adjustments will necessitate a shifting of dialogue and foreign policy orientation in 
Washington among policymakers and scholars. In this respect, Brzezinski acknowledges 
America’s changing role in the world and the need for policymakers to engage in a 
discourse with the American people on the matter – something that is yet to happen 
(Kakutani, 2012). The discourse, Walt observes, ought to focus less on America’s global 
responsibilities and more on its national interests for the benefit of the American people. 
Therefore, discussing and shaping foreign policy would need to concentrate on the 
benefits it could offer the US rather than other foreign states.  
America’s current foreign policy tenants were established during the Cold War, 
when military-oriented policies and rhetoric made sense due to the nature of the 
confrontation with the Soviet Union. However, times have changed and the current global 
environment necessitates the adoption of new strategies. Nowadays, the majority of 
security problems stem from regional-scaled rivalries, failed and falling states, and “local 
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quagmires” (Walt, 2012). Accordingly, Walt advises Washington to distance itself from 
those security problems in order to recover faster and equip itself with the right tools to 
face potential rising competitors as they emerge in the near future.  
 Brzezinski argues that an American retreat, whether voluntary or not, will have 
undesirable repercussion on the rest of the world. However, the outcome of such an 
occurrence will not lead to the emergence of an “effective global successor” like China, 
but will likely initiate a “protracted phase of rather inconclusive and somewhat chaotic 
realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more 
losers” (Kakutani, 2012). Robert Kagan goes beyond Brzezinski’s arguments adding that 
a dominant America is what stands between stability and the regression toward a more 
dangerous world (Brooks, 2007).  
 
2.4.1. Retreat or Defeat: America and the Middle East:  
 While few political analysts and researchers predicted the Arab Spring, 
Washington was on a quest to create a pro-US ‘New Middle East’, weaker and more 
vulnerable to external intervention. This project constituted a military roadmap that 
revolves around the creation of an “arc of instability, chaos, and violence extending from 
Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria to Iraq, the Persian Gulf, Iran, and the borders of NATO-
garrisoned Afghanistan” (Nazemroaya, 2006). The Arab uprisings have affected 
countries of critical import to US interests, such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, and 
successfully pushed out regimes the US has backed for decades to secure specific 
economic and security interests related either to the flow of oil or Israel’s position in the 
region. US foreign policy has tended to be set within a frame of reference centered on a 
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broad sense of self-interest, oil, national security, realism/pragmatism, and democracy 
and human rights promotion – albeit usually only at the rhetorical level.  
 As part of a fundamental and visible realignment of US foreign policy in the 
MENA region, US support of Israel can no longer be sustained without a price or be 
presumed to be unconditional. In the past, US bias toward Israel was reflected in the form 
of ‘strategic advantage’ in weaponry and training, needless bankrolling and arming of the 
coercively “Jewish” state, safeguarding of Israeli immunity of international law, and half-
heartedness in pressuring Israel to negotiate in earnest with the Palestinians could be 
written off in the past as supporting the ‘only democracy in a sea of dictatorships,’ albeit 
a putative and highly contested formulation. However, in the wake of the Arab uprisings, 
continuing this special treatment of Israel is patently unfounded in terms of proclaimed 
US values and principles and therefore devastatingly undermines US interests and 
efficacy in the region. This is due to the fact that the barrier for freedom of expression 
that was installed by dictatorships has been broken, and people across the region feel that 
they can revolt time and again when faced by policies that do not reflect their wishes and 
orientations.  
 The Arab Spring exposes the floundering state of American foreign policy, at 
least in the MENA region. Thomas Carothers argues that there are many reasons to 
expect that “US policy is unlikely to coalesce around any unified line,” (p. 5) with respect 
to the Arab Spring (Carothers, 2011). For Carothers (2011), US rhetoric will likely shift 
to support democracy but “policy on the ground will vary greatly from country to 
country, embodying inconsistencies that reflect clashing imperatives” (p. 5). Yet, he 
offers no remedy, and no critique of this sort of dangerous, albeit historical, inconsistency 
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in US policy. Clearly, the US needs to take an unequivocal stand in favor of the Arab 
Spring uprisings as democratizing movements. 
 Daniel Byman (2011) sees that US interests in MENA are contingent upon its 
relationship with Israel, and that its ‘close’ ties spell certain complications for 
Washington as it will need to respond to both the “irrational and rational concerns [that] 
that will drive Israeli policy” (p. 124). US support of Israel at every turn is extremely 
misguided and will give rise to increased antipathy toward the US and Israel; this has 
deleterious effects on US interests in MENA and potentially beyond should the rise of 
new popularly-elected Arab regimes someday politicize the flow and price of oil. 
Unquestioningly supporting Israel costs the US more than it benefits it – it always has, 
and the stakes have been appreciably raised to unaffordable heights in the context of the 
Arab Spring. 
Mishra contends that American power in the Middle East and Southeast Asia is in 
decline due to the “collapse or weakening of pro-American regimes” in the region, 
notably in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen (Mishra, 2012). This is where one notices 
the slight difference with Walt’s analysis that differentiates between decline of power and 
decline of influence. However, a shared pattern of analysis between both authors suggests 
that Washington’s self-proclaimed moral obligation to spread democracy and freedoms 
has been the primary shortcoming of American foreign policy. Mishra claims that after 
overlooking the “political awakening of peoples” during the Cold War by over-
emphasizing its attention on Communism, Washington – already facing a “deficit of 
trust” – need not miss the “mass longing for political transformation” in the Middle East 
(Mishra, 2012). 
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 Consequently, Mishra and Walt allude to a pressing need for an American foreign 
policy adjustment, one that acknowledges political and cultural differences with others, 
especially in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. In fact, Brzezinski claims that in 
addition to a foreign policy adjustment, Washington needs to make many changes to its 
dysfunctional and paralyzed political system in case it wanted to recover and retain a 
dominant global stature (Freedland, 2012). In addition, Washington has to adopt a 
comprehensive geopolitical vision that will be receptive to changing historical contexts 
and challenges. As opposed to Kagan’s military-oriented approach, Brzezinski remarks 
that cooperation is the path to adopt. He argues that only a dynamic and strategic 
collaboration between the US and a stable Europe could revitalize the West. This 
cooperation would enable the West to build a constructive partnership with a rising and 
self-assured East (Brzezinski, 2012). 
 Whereas in the past the US could posture or employ a rhetoric of pro-Israeli bias 
founded on the notion of shared democratic principles amid a region of autocrats, the US 
can no longer make such problematic and plainly fictitious claims (Byman, 2011, pp. 
127-128). Arab people are dying on a daily basis in the name of democracy and 
legitimate, representative rule, as well as social justice, meritocracy, egalitarianism, 
university human dignity, and human rights – these are the very same constellations of 
values that, in theory, guide the US moral compass and the US must now realign to 
support the uprisings and put considerable pressure on Israel to either do the same and 
come to a final settlement on Palestinian statehood or risk remaining on the wrong side of 
history and becoming regarded by the US government as another apartheid South Africa. 
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2.5. Conclusion: 
 Assessing the future of America’s global stature must take into account the 
emergence of a new global structure. John Ikenberry posits that the future would bring 
about many challenges to the US. Instead of confronting one big threat, the US will likely 
face a “diffuse, shifting, and uncertain” series of security challenges, namely “collapsing 
nation-states, global warming, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, pandemics, energy 
scarcity and so on” (Brooks, 2007). Accordingly, the US would need to disregard the 
development of a grand strategy to cope with one enemy. Instead, Washington will have 
to advance and adopt a “milieu-based approach,” putting itself at the center of new global 
multilateral institutions that would bring nations together to solve shared problems 
collectively (Brooks, 2007). Brzezinski corroborates this vision. He argues that the 
United States ought to form a large and durable geopolitical foundation that would enable 
constructive cooperation between nations and address the ambitions and concerns of the 
global population (Brzezinski, 2012). 
 Academics like Robert Kagan have overemphasized the military aspects of power 
as a tool to measure a country’s health and status in terms of global influence. The 
problem with such an approach is that it downplays the rising financial influence of 
China and Russia and its implications on American power and influence. Scholars have 
failed to either prove or disprove the notion of American decline due to the lack of 
conclusive evidence. US influence seems to be declining in regions like the Middle East, 
but Washington still maintains a level of leverage over certain states and non-state actors. 
The only certainty seems to be the effect of rising economies, notably China and Russia, 
on America’s global stature. The emergence of China and Russia as global economic, and 
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potentially military powerhouses, has been shifting the unipolar global structure 
gradually toward multipolarity. Thus, the assessment of America’s current and future role 
in the world ought to be consistent with the new evolving global dynamics of power and 
influence that will be elaborated in the coming chapters. 
 Washington’s primary post-Cold War challenge was to maintain a unipolar world 
order that ensures US supremacy. The US undertook constant and significant geostrategic 
adjustments that repositioned Washington’s foreign policy, moving it from Europe to the 
Middle East and Asia in response to new arising challenges to its global stature (Vuving, 
2007). In contrast to the Cold War, during which the nature of struggle was that of global 
dominance between two world powers, the current global strategic map is characterized 
by various struggles for global and regional dominance between more than two powers. 
Four strategic regions constitute the bulk of those struggles: West and Central Europe, 
“Central Eurasia” (former USSR), the Middle East, and East and South Asia (Vuving, 
2007).  The next chapters in this thesis examine the strategic contest for regional 
supremacy between the US and China in Asia, and that between the US and Russia in the 
Middle East. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
CHINA: A THREAT TO AMERICA? 
 
3.1. Introduction: 
Describing the nature of current Sino-American relations can be a difficult task. 
Some have contended that the US and China could very well be embroiled in a new cold 
war that is still in its initial stages (Perlez, 2012). Washington’s cautious and gradual 
retreat from the Middle East, accompanied by a measured reinforcement of its presence 
in Asia, may be taken as a proof of this claim. What is certain is that China can be 
considered the first non-Western power – since Japan (1867-1912) – that possesses the 
potential to influence and/or reshape the existing global order (Chellaney, 2012). 
Nevertheless, the notion of a new cold war between the two nations is far-fetched. Both 
countries are in fact economic partners and have mutually beneficial bilateral trade 
relations. 
When it was argued that the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union marked the beginning of an era in which liberal democracy would spread globally, 
Brzezinski warned about the rise of possible forces of turmoil in the developing world, 
along with weaknesses that could damage the West’s global sway (1993). He contended 
that China – and not Russia – was likely to take on a global leadership role. In this 
respect, Brzezinski underscored the importance of an American-Chinese dialogue that 
would diminish the likelihood of conflicts between both nations, while also being a 
safeguard for regional stability (Brzezinski, 2012). He warned that America’s emphasis 
on “material wealth, on consumption and on the propagation of self-indulgence as the 
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definition of the good life,” along with internal political and economic problems, could 
jeopardize its posture as a global power (Brzezinski, 1993, p. 112).   
Brzezinski argues that the world’s center of gravity is shifting from the West to 
the East due to America’s internal political and economic problems – unsustainable 
national debt, a faltering public education, and a highly partisan political process –, ill-
advised foreign policy decisions, and the mounting command, by potential rivals, of what 
he calls “twenty-first century modernity” (Brzezinski, 2012, p. 73). Those problems 
constitute obstacles to America in its quest to maintain a dominant global stature. 
America’s current engagement in the Middle East, notably in Syria, and the active role of 
both China and Russia in hindering US strategies there, demonstrates Washington’s 
inability to conduct foreign policy unilaterally as it once did before. It also emphasizes 
the importance of alliance building in the struggle for power, and indicates that balancing 
American power will largely depend on the building of strong alliances that will provide 
contenders with the necessary requisites to challenge American unilateralism.  
According to Brzezinski (1993), China’s imposing “imperial lineage” and 
ongoing strategic “tradition of carefully calibrated patience” (p. 79) have been 
fundamental in carving the nation’s ascension in terms of power and influence. These two 
factors will remain crucial to an all-encompassing growth that will allow China to 
challenge American hegemony, or at least be on par with America. This is only 
conditional to a gradual American decline and to Chinese prudence, scaled growth, and 
capitalization on America’s mistakes. Brzezinski claims that China explicitly accepts the 
dynamics of the existing international system, while implicitly expecting them to change. 
Change as anticipated by China will not be beneficial should the system drastically 
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collapse. It will be fruitful only within the framework of a “gradual redistribution of 
power” that will grant China more influence and international recognition (p. 79).  
China is not yet ready to dethrone the US and assume the reigns of global 
leadership, and will not be in the foreseeable future. A fortiori, China will merely look to 
balance against, and not overthrow the US given its investments in America and the 
realization that a global crisis affecting America’s global primacy will reflect negatively 
on China’s well-being, and minimize the chances of confrontation. It is notable to 
mention that China currently projects an appealing image through its outstanding Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) annual growth rate, one that gives it a substantial competitive 
edge in Latin America and Africa (Brzezinski, 1993, p. 81). Accordingly, the key issue to 
be monitored is whether China can and will take advantage of the existing status quo to 
balance, along with Russia and other allies, against the US and its allies.  
This chapter evaluates Chinese power and global status to understand whether 
China can balance American power or not yet. It starts by assessing the tenants of 
China’s power that lie in prudence and economic growth. Then, it moves to address the 
Sino-American confrontation in the Asia-Pacific to appraise the prospects for war 
between China and the US. The chapter also talks about the importance of alliance 
building to China as a tactic to balance American power. 
 
3.2. Assessing China’s Power: 
 “Be not afraid of growing slowly; be afraid only of standing still:” a Chinese 
proverb that depicts the ideology that is currently driving China’s ascension to power. 
China has been steadily growing in wealth and power, which, as Walt claims, necessitates 
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an accurate, broad, and genuine assessment by diplomats, academics, and independent 
scholars in the US. An accurate assessment of China’s power by policymakers in 
Washington will prevent the US from underestimating China, while also precluding the 
inflation of its threat and the overstatement of its military capabilities (Walt, 2012). Walt 
adds that exaggerating Chinese power could be detrimental to the US economy as it 
might result in unnecessary defense spending to protect its Asian allies and ensure 
superiority over China. Adversely, Dan Blumenthal contends that deterrence, by 
highlighting military power, is the only way for the US to keep China at bay. Blumenthal 
believes that America’s leaders should engage in what Walt calls threat-inflation and 
task-deflation. These two notions imply that the US would be buying peace by making 
the case that greater defense spending and military presence in Asia will avert a potential 
conflict that could be more costly to Washington (Blumenthal, 2012). 
 
3.2.1. Elements of Power – Prudence and Economic Growth: 
Assessing China’s power requires examining thoroughly two elements that the 
nation’s leadership adopts: strategic prudence and long-term planning. Brzezinski (1993) 
notes that the leadership in China has been careful about exhibiting excitement about, and 
claims to global leadership. Chinese leaders seem to be convinced that America’s decline 
and China’s rise are inevitable, but need to unfold progressively. Brzezinski mentions 
that the guiding principle that is currently shaping policies in China is based on Deng 
Xiaoping’s following statement:  
Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide 
our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low 
profile, and never claim leadership (p. 81). 
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Thus, Beijing will be focusing on growing economically, translating economic power 
into political influence abroad, and waiting for Washington to commit fatal mistakes in 
order to capitalize on them. This explains China’s inconspicuous policy orientation 
regarding the current Syrian crisis on which it adopts a clear stance but relies on Russia to 
convey it. It also emphasizes the importance of alliance-building in balancing American 
power and influence. If true, this line of analysis posits that alliance-building is the short-
term strategy to balance American power and influence in areas of strategic geopolitical 
significance. In turn, this will constitute a strong foundation for toppling America and 
assuming global leadership in the future, in what Brzezinski thinks to be the continuation 
of China’s “impressive imperial lineage” (Brzezinski, 1993, p. 79). 
Understanding China’s rising potential in a new global order necessitates an 
examination of its engagement in the global political economy and the transition from 
socialism to a form of Chinese capitalism.  As Shaun Breslin (2007) states, China’s 
economic strength will allow it to surpass the US in the foreseeable future. Being the 
second largest economy and the fourth largest trader globally, and possessing 
considerable amounts of foreign currency reserves, China imposes itself as a force with 
substantial weight in the international community.  
The transition from radical totalitarianism to nationalistic authoritarianism proved 
to be a turning point for China, and translated into remarkable economic growth and 
success (Brzezinski, 1993). The transition to capitalism has evolved through three stages: 
policy reform, abandonment of the old system, and a process of macroeconomic control 
over development issues (Breslin, 2007). The transition began in 1978 when the nation’s 
leadership sought to refurbish the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) via a process of re-
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legitimization. The reform concentrated on important issues related to ideology, 
economic performance, and stability. It reaffirmed Chinese nationalism, advocated for 
capital accumulation and economic growth, and reassured political stability through CCP 
rule. Then, between 1984 and 1988, decisions to reform the economic configuration and 
to expand the productive force allowed for the emergence of legalized non-state actors 
and the privatization of numerous state-owned enterprises, which catalyzed the economy 
and capitalized economic growth (Breslin, 2007).   
China’s national wealth has risen along with significant investments in regions 
like Latin America and Africa. For instance, trade between China and Africa achieved a 
thousand (1000) percent growth, climbing from ten (10) billion to a hundred and seven 
(107) billion dollars between 2000 and 2008 (Brzezinski, 1993, p. 81). In 2005, China’s 
economy grew by almost 10 percent, achieving a GDP of $2.26 trillion (Wyne, 2006). 
However, assessing China’s potential to challenge American dominance can only be 
measured accurately if these investments are successfully translated into political and 
military influence. China’s global economic expansion could be used to reinforce the 
nation’s army, which would constitute a threat to the US. This gives rise to a debate about 
containing or engaging China. Engagement remains the most probable strategy to be 
adopted as a special task force required to assess China’s military power determined that 
“the balance between the US and China, both globally and in Asia, is likely to remain 
decisively in America’s favor beyond the next twenty years” (Wyne, 2006, p. 78). 
China’s economic reforms and the resulting success revolve around three 
elements: fiscal reforms to balance local, central, and share taxes; creating additional 
budget revenues through taxes and extra system revenues; and increasing financial 
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autonomy in certain sectors, which generates significant economic development. The 
success of economic reforms was made possible by joint political and social reforms 
locally that paved the way for system democratization and social flexibility (Breslin, 
2007). Local reforms were accompanied by less isolationism and more gradual 
engagement globally to achieve international economic integration. The country’s 
admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 allowed for further 
improvements on existing reforms, and prompted China’s leadership to encourage trade 
and investment when deemed profitable domestically, and restrain them when regarded 
as potentially harmful to its constituencies. Prior to being admitted to the WTO, China 
gradually integrated into the international economy through different phases that included 
the establishment of restricted Export Processing Zones, the adoption of the “twenty-two 
regulations” that created an enabling environment for foreign investments, and the 
reception of Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs). As a result, China established itself as a 
chief actor on the global stage (Breslin, 2007). 
However, this transition generated negative social repercussions that could 
obstruct China’s ascension to power. The transition into a Chinese form of capitalism has 
generated social inequalities between classes, as as result of which the new middle class 
has benefited from increased prosperity and access to global information. It was 
perceived as a way of creating “a new capitalist ruling class in China which exploits the 
Chinese workers and farmers” (Breslin, 2007, p. 90). Despite China’s high GDP scores, 
the country’s per capita GDP (PCGDP) remains substantially low (Wyne, 2006). 
Nevertheless, this incites new political and social expectations, generates animosoty 
toward prevailing impediments to political rights, and encourages political 
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nonconformism. However, these are issues that the Chinese leadership can address with 
tranquility as China slowly but steadily ascends to power. This process is starting to take 
shape as semiofficial Chinese commentators began to contest American unilateralism and 
the legitimacy of a currently failing status quo that is based on the American principles 
and culture. Those commentators suggest that China initiates a calculated campaign to 
promote the Chinese model based on “harmony” globally. This concept would depict 
China’s peaceful rise and propagate “the concepts of justice, win-win, and joint 
development” (Brzezinski, 1993, p. 83). 
 
3.2.2. Sino-American Confrontation in the Asia-Pacific: 
 China currently faces a confrontation with Japan in the East China Sea, over the 
Senkaku Islands – seized by Japan in 1895 after a war with China. After being 
administered for over twenty-seven years by the US, the islands were reacquired by 
Japan, with ownership going to a private family. In 2012, the Japanese national 
government bought the islands, eliciting much discontent in China and inflating the 
prospect of a military confrontation between the two states (Walt, 2012).  
Jane Perlez asserts that diplomatic and academic circles around the world 
acknowledge that the US is contending with an extremely confident China. The 
confrontation between the two nations comes amid rising skepticism from both countries 
about a potential conflict of interests in Asia – notably with regard to Japan over the 
Senkaku islands, considered by China as “territorial imperatives” (Perlez, 2012). The 
author reports that China’s leader Xi Jinping’s background and close ties to the country’s 
rapidly developing army could steer Sino-American relations toward a more 
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confrontational path. Perlez suggests that China could push for greater integration with 
Taiwan – a policy that Taiwan rejects – and emphasize on fortifying the army to 
safeguard its interests in Asia and abroad. In return, America’s allies in Asia – notably 
Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore, and India – expect the US to increase its 
military presence in the region, as promised by Barack Obama, despite doubts about its 
ability to do so.  
 The situation presents the US with a delicate problem as it would be expected to 
stand by its Japanese ally in case of a confrontation with China. Furthermore, Taiwan’s 
siding with China amplifies Washington’s uncertainties and ambiguities, leaving it with 
an uncertain stance on the matter. Walt suggests that Japan offers to sell the islands to 
China to test its resolve and intentions. Thus, if China refuses to buy, Japan and its allies 
would emerge from the dispute as the “reasonable party” (Walt, 2012). Walt adds that as 
China’s power rises, Beijing will be looking to depict the US and its regional allies as the 
primary source of instability in East and Southeast Asia. Consequently, it will be unlikely 
that other states join Washington’s efforts of balancing China. If China were to be 
perceived as belligerent, the US would find it easy to preserve its Asian partnerships and 
foster cooperation between Eastern and Southeastern Asian states. However, security 
competition in East Asia will continue to increase as the dispute will unlikely be resolved 
by bargaining. 
 Along the same lines, Jin Canrong suggests that “China should shoulder some 
responsibility for the United States and the United States should share power with China” 
(Perlez, 2012). In response, Walt contends that the US will be unable to preclude China’s 
expanding influence as its power rises. Instead, he suggests that a “smart great power” 
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such as the US should “try to maneuver potential adversaries [like China] into taking on 
costly burdens that bring few benefits” (Walt, 2012). Walt contends that several factors 
will determine the outcome of the Sino-American rivalry. He argues that the country that 
will benefit the most is the one that will best manage its economy – that being the 
primary source of national power. Other decisive factors will be the ability to gain the 
support of other important countries, engage in costly missions to defend allies that do 
not offer much in terms of geopolitical and strategic gains, and identify a crisis before 
being affected by it.  
  Going back to Walt’s arguments about the interrelation between the notion of 
threat and foreign policymaking in the US, current talks about China’s military threat to 
the US and the development in Chinese weapon technology are arguably part of threat 
inflation about China. Considering the present military status quo, one can deduce that 
America’s threat to Chinese territory far exceeds the threat that China could constitute to 
American soil (Walt, 2012). A logical argument stipulates that more advanced US 
military capabilities concern China and drive it to modernize its force with the aim of 
preserving the capacity to deter and overcome US defenses. Such developments might be 
wrongfully used by “hawks […] to portray China as a rising revisionist threat” (Walt, 
2012). He maintains that China’s military development is guided by the same premises 
that prompted the US to establish a “strategic triad” for deterrent stability in the 1950s.  
 
3.3. Does Confrontation Mean War? 
 As things stand, it seems that the world could be heading toward an inevitable 
security competition between the US and China if the latter’s economy keeps growing. 
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Walt contends that pursuing and enhancing strategic missile defenses is not the optimal 
approach for the US to adopt to contain Chinese nuclear modernization. Such a plan will 
be strategically obsolete and economically costly. Instead of enhancing military 
capabilities to deter China, policymakers in Washington should establish a negotiating 
framework that will create and execute regulations similar to those that slashed US and 
Russian arsenals. A diplomatic maneuver will decelerate, and potentially terminate 
China’s quest to acquire second-strike capabilities that enable its military to retaliate 
against any potential first strike by the US (Walt, 2012).  
 While Walt promotes diplomacy as a means of appeasing Sino-American 
confrontations, Bonnie Glaser affirms the need for Washington to bolster its leadership in 
the Asia-Pacific region in order to sustain peace and stability and safeguard its interests 
there. Glaser suggests that reviving the American economy would be the elemental 
measure that Washington should adopt to achieve the aforementioned goals (Glaser B. S., 
2012). She argues that China has historically exploited American weaknesses. Glaser 
(2012) further contends that:  
Historically, the Chinese have taken advantage of perceived 
American weakness and shifts in the global balance of power. In 
1974 China seized the Paracel Islands from Saigon just after the 
United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam signed the Paris 
Peace Treaty, which signaled the US withdrawal from the region. 
When the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev met one of Deng 
Xiaoping’s “three obstacles” requirements for better ties and 
withdrew from Can Ranh Bay, Vietnam, in 1988, China snatched 
seven of the Spratly Islands from Hanoi. Two decades later, as the 
United States-Philippines base agreement was terminated, China 
grabbed Mischief Reef from Manila. 
 
Glaser suggests that Beijing currently bases its assertive policies toward its 
neighbors in the region on the belief that America has already started to decline and that 
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the tide is shifting in China’s favor. She adds that the US could prevent this 
“miscalculation” by assertively balancing against China and assuring its allies about 
Washington’s capacity to safeguard peace in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 In this regard, both the US and China have ample reasons for concern. On the one 
hand, Washington’s main objective is to democratize China and prevent it from 
dominating Asia. On the other hand, China’s rising power is conducive to growing 
regional and global ambitions (Blumenthal, 2012). However, Walt suggests that states 
cannot build their policies on the assumption that others will remain benevolent. Crisis 
and conflict prevention begins with the development of self-defense strategies by states to 
protect national territory and interests. China is presently adopting this path by translating 
some of its mounting economic wealth into military power in an attempt to “create a 
more favorable security environment in its neighborhood” – a similar strategy to 
America’s “Monroe Doctrine” (Walt, 2012). Brahma Chellaney also argues that China’s 
military preemption – since 1950 – for the sake of “strategic defense” elicits significant 
security concerns in Asia. He notes that China’s military interventions were performed in 
times during which the country was “poor” and “internally troubled” (Chellaney, 2012). 
Hence, the author suggests that fears for security troubles in Asia should be mounting 
now that China is prospering economically. However, he adds that the multiplicity of 
powers in Asia will likely keep China’s “expansionist impulses” in check.  
Preserving Chinese security in Asia would logically require China to forestall a 
bulky American military presence in its environs by attempting to cast US forces out of 
the Asia-Pacific region (Walt, 2012). In that event, an American retreat from the region 
would be a strategic defeat for America, one that would grant China a growing influence 
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globally. To hedge against a rising China, Washington is looking to fashion new Asian 
and international alliances, while consolidating existing ones. Obama duly affirmed 
America’s determination to maintain its presence as a power in the Asia-Pacific region 
for many years to come (Feng, 2012). Walt suggests that this strategic geopolitical 
confrontation will likely increase the potential of conflict in the region. China’s neighbors 
will seemingly reject its “benevolent hegemony” and ally with the US (2012). 
Chellaney’s analysis validates this argument as he observes that Asian states will be 
compelled to align with the US if China were to pursue an intimidating foreign policy 
(Chellaney, 2012). Moreover, Glaser argues that China’s neighboring countries will 
likely be absorbed into its circle of influence should Washington fail to take action and 
rebalance against China in the Asia-Pacific region (Glaser B. S., 2012). 
Along the same lines, Zhu Feng maintains that talking about balancing against 
China as a new US strategy in the Asia-Pacific region is premature. However, he notes 
that this approach explicitly indicates a desire by Washington to divert its attention 
cautiously away from Europe and the Middle East to focus on Asia (Feng, 2012). Feng 
adds that Washington would initiate a concrete military restructuring phase in the region 
that would revolve around “setting Darwin Port in Australia as the new submarine corps 
base, rotating military presence to the Philippines, ushering in the Pentagon’s global 
security programs that very specifically target China” (Feng, 2012). Christopher Hill 
provides a similar argument. He argues that the Obama administration has been turning 
its attention toward the Asia-Pacific region (Hill, 2011). Hill contends that exiting from 
the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq ought to be accompanied simultaneously with a 
consistently assertive American policy in Asia, sensible enough to reassure Beijing of 
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Washington’s reluctance to induce a Sino-American confrontation that would cost the US 
dearly.   
Nevertheless, Walt contends that existing economic ties between China and the 
US will confine the rivalry to certain appeasing boundaries. These boundaries will 
eliminate the tensions and decrease the chances for war between both states, and will 
ensure that hostilities will not lead to an undesired confrontation between the US and 
China. As Feng argues, the Sino-American relationship is profitable for both countries no 
matter how complex it can be (Feng, 2012). However, unlike the self-sufficient Soviet 
Union, China depends on raw materials and overseas markets heavily, which will 
possibly compel it to secure global alliances and protect its sea lines of communication 
(Walt, 2012).  
The above analysis suggests that the chances for a military confrontation between 
the US and China are very slim. Walt posits that the potential for a Sino-American war 
will depend on the wisdom of leaders in Washington and Beijing. Prudence and 
perception will preserve peace and increase the likelihood of cooperation between the US 
and China. Feng adds that the two global powers are unlikely to confront each other in a 
“new cold war”. He argues that China has not reached the “great power” status yet, and 
should engage in a measured process of learning the tools to become one. A significant 
disproportion of power between the US and China still exists, despite recent Chinese 
military and economic developments. 
Tensions between the two countries will certainly rise in the future, but the 
relationship will probably remain manageable. Feng asserts that competition has proven 
to be beneficial for the US and China. Several instances in the past indicate an orientation 
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by both countries toward handling rather than escalating conflicts, while constructively 
reacting to thorny issues (Feng, 2012). Blumenthal suggests that in spite of having 
conflicting interests, both sides are reluctant to transform strategic competition into 
conflict. Managing the rivalry constructively would require Washington and Beijing to 
recognize their differences and focus on their mutual interests (Blumenthal, 2012). It is in 
the best interest of the US and its Asian allies to seek and sustain constructive relations 
with China (Hill, 2011). 
 
3.4. Balancing through Alliance Building: 
Throughout history, the continuous presence of a hegemonic state led to the 
emergence of what Ali Wyne calls the hegemonic continuum theory. This theory posits 
that the international system will always be influenced by one superpower with 
considerable military, economic, and political power until supplanted by a state or 
coalition of states (Wyne, 2006). During the Cold War, alliance-building was one of the 
decisive factors that determined the outcome of the Russo-American confrontation. The 
current assessment of confrontation as a possible outcome of bipolarity suggests that 
alliance building and polarization will once again be crucial in tipping a camp over 
another. Thus, balancing American power cannot be achieved by a single state alone, and 
has to be assessed within the framework of a strong alliance of states. In that regard, 
Brzezinski (1993) claims that a weakening America is unlikely to be balanced by “a 
single preeminent” (p. 75) power. He suggests that the faltering of American hegemony 
will likely produce a phase of “realignments of both global and regional power” (p. 75). 
This statement reflects the magnitude of alliance building in future power contests, and 
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the emergence of polarized camps based on geological interests. These alliances will 
provide global powers like China and Russia with enough leverage and the “requisite 
combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power” (p. 77) to balance 
against the US in a new world order.  
A key debate has emerged recently about the effect of a possible Sino-American 
confrontation in Asia, and the role of alliances within Asia in determining the outcome of 
a conflict. Both Washington and Beijing have close Asian allies, but their role in the 
event of a confrontation, along with their willingness to be involved in case it arises are 
questionable and different from other areas such as the Middle East. While the Middle 
East provides a fertile ground for alliance building based on geopolitics and state policies 
supporting or resisting American strategies in the region, Asia has been fostering healthy 
inter-state relations grounded in economic development and collaboration. What this 
means is that despite America’s shift toward Asia, China will seek to make the Sino-
American confrontation contested outside of Asia, in regions like the Middle East where 
conflicts and struggles for domination of natural resources have been ongoing for a 
considerable amount of time.  
In recent years, the need for consensual stability in East Asia has been discussed 
extensively throughout the region due to constant diplomatic quarrels and the rise of 
nationalism and military spending by states. However, the nature and premises of 
stability are yet to be determined. In this respect, the principle of democratic peace – or 
Pax Democratica – has been the trend that the US and Europe have adopted – notably 
after World War II – as a guiding principle of foreign policy and integration. This 
Kantian “liberal” perception of international relations relies on three essential 
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components: political democratization, deep economic interdependence between states, 
and the presence of reliable institutions allowing multilateral state interaction. It is 
difficult to presume that this principle could be implemented in East Asia due to the 
region’s wide array of political systems, as well as differences in country sizes and 
degree of development (Young-kwan, 2011), but an Asian version of it has emerged in 
the form of a Pax Pacifica. 
An analysis of the relations between East Asian countries in the past thirty years 
suggests that the establishment of a Pax Pacifica based on economic integration and 
collaboration could constitute the backbone of consensual stability not only in East Asia, 
but in Asia as a whole. In fact, economic collaboration has proven to be fruitful in Asia, 
despite political rifts between East Asian states (Young-kwan, 2011). When completely 
and successfully applied in the region, one could make the case that a Pax Pacifica could 
bridge the differences with the US and Europe, and eventually generate what Henry 
Lambert called a Pax Economica, the sort of peace that would abolish international 
conflicts. 
 Kevin Rudd acknowledges that the confrontation between the US and China will 
have significant repercussions on Asia’s future. He argues that this status quo will not 
necessarily imply that Asia will become a “Sino-American duopoly,” particularly with 
the emergence of dynamic economies and the expansion of free-trade agreements in the 
region (Rudd, 2012). To support his argument, Rudd highlights the rising dynamic 
economic power of Asian countries – like India, South Korea, Indonesia, and Australia – 
that favor open-economy politics. He notes that the combined gross domestic product of 
Asian countries – excluding China – is significantly higher than that of China, and 
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relatively proportionate to that of the US. Accordingly, one deduces that Asian countries 
retain the capability of detaching themselves politically from potential Chinese and 
American orbits, and sustaining themselves economically should a Sino-American 
conflict erupt in the region. 
 Despite the region’s territorial disputes and security disagreements, there seems to 
be a widespread desire among Asian countries to reinforce national sovereignty and 
institutionalize cooperation (Rudd, 2012). Unlike earlier times when Japan ruled over 
Asia unopposed, several powers exist, and need to coexist in Asia today – Japan, South 
Korea, Vietnam, India, and Indonesia, in addition to China (Chellaney, 2012).  Economic 
and security collaboration could become a viable tool to circumvent a potential rift that 
could possibly polarize Asia into Chinese and American blocs. The author contends that 
the establishment of the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors 
(G-20), along with the East Asia Summit that took place in 2011, ought to be the 
foundation for a global reconciliation of interests. The inclusion of Asian countries, 
especially China, in deliberations about international financial matters during the summit 
proved to be constructive in terms of accelerating the global economy’s recovery (Rudd, 
2012). This contradicts Brzezinski’s claim that cooperation in several regions, including 
Asia, will decline, and that states such as Japan and India will consider increasing their 
political and military cooperation with Europe and the US to hedge against China 
(Brzezinski, 1993, p. 77).  
 In recent years, China has been taking firm steps toward global inclusion by 
enhancing its global leverage through cooperation with the rising BRICS economies. The 
international community – and above all the US – is in dire need for cooperation with 
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China and an economically healthy Asia due to the poor state of the global economy. 
Rudd suggests that policymakers today should contemplate the establishment of a “Pax 
Pacifica,” a sort of peace that will acknowledge the existence of US and Chinese power, 
and revolve around common security principles. In that event, Pax Pacifica would 
constitute a safeguard for the region should Sino-American relations deteriorate (Rudd, 
2012).  
 
3.5. Conclusion: 
China has been ascending to power due to the prudence of its leadership, a focus 
on economic growth, and strategic alliance building. Chinese prudence and patience in 
defining and applying policies have made it a force to be reckoned with, at least 
economically. Facts prove that for the time being, the US and China are too tied to clash, 
however. China’s admission to the WTO has generated several trading disputes with the 
US and the EU. Nevertheless, the fact remains that China constitutes a large market for 
American and European investments (Breslin, 2007). Any deterioration in relations 
between both nations therefore remains a normal reflection of foreign policy conduction 
in international relations, as well as the pursuit of interests in regions of geostrategic 
significance in terms of richness in natural resources. Asian countries have proved to be 
resilient to extreme polarization and conflicts due to their focus on collaboration and 
economic growth, and forced both the US and China to look elsewhere for building 
alliances. 
Balancing American power will require China to foster constructive alliances with 
other influential states such as Russia and Iran. It will also require Beijing to capitalize on 
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American mistakes and maintain scaled economic growth. Change in the international 
structure of power is already being felt, but comprehensive redistribution and balancing 
of power will necessitate more time to materialize as China is not ready to challenge 
American by itself. In turn, America has to assess Chinese power thoroughly to neither 
overestimate, nor underestimate it. Overestimating China’s power will reflect negatively 
on America’s economy by prompting unnecessary defense spending, while 
underestimating it will allow Beijing to achieve greater economic growth and translate it 
into military power and political influence abroad.  
The orientation of Asian states toward collaboration, and their rejection of 
polarization, generates two outcomes. One the one hand, they remove Asian allies from 
what can be called the “Asian equation” and make it very unlikely for them to be 
involved in any potential struggle between the US and China. On the other hand, they 
leave both Beijing and Washington in the hunt for global allies to balance against each 
other. This matter will be more tangible in conflicts that transcend Asian borders. A case 
in point would be the Syrian crisis in the Middle East, which brings Russia into play. 
While US attempts to build an alliance that will support its anti-Syrian regime policies 
and facilitate its political and military maneuvers are obvious, China does not seem to be 
dissociating from Russia in its support for a camp that rejects US interventionism and 
seeks to tame American power and influence in Syria and the region. This theme will be 
addressed thoroughly in the following chapter that evaluates Russia’s resurgence and its 
relations with China in terms of balancing American power. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE RESURGENCE OF RUSSIA 
4.1. Introduction: 
While the fall of the Soviet Union has undermined Moscow’s influence in 
regional and global affairs, Russia is currently seeking to revive the status it once had and 
retake a dominant position in the emerging international system. Historically, Russia 
attempted to dominate areas of direct interest such as Eurasia and certain areas in the 
greater Middle East. It is currently regaining its great power status, at least at a regional 
level, and is attempting to preserve the security and prosperity of geographically close 
territories in Asia and the Muslim world (Tsygankov, 2010). Despite not possessing the 
adequate military and economic tools to make it a global power, Russia is establishing 
partnerships with other states, namely China and Iran, to be able to balance American 
power within the framework of alliances.    
Understanding Russian foreign policy requires an examination of the country’s 
self-identification process that is historically based on what Alicja Curanovic calls “the 
West-East axis”. Curanovic argues that Russia’s policies toward the West and the East 
are driven by two important factors: identity and fear. She adds that the West and the East 
have unevenly influenced Russian self-identification. While “the West was a dominating 
concept in the self-narration of Russians, the East was mostly a function of the interaction 
between Russia and the West” (Curanović, 2012, p. 2). Russia’s relations with both the 
West and the East have been conditioned by religion, an essential factor in the shaping of 
the nation’s identity and perception of uniqueness. Curanovic posits that while Western 
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Christianity represented a challenge to Russian Orthodox rudiments and strained relations 
with the West, China’s neutrality in religious identity paved the way for pragmatic 
relations between Moscow and Beijing. Thus, preserving Russia’s distinguished identity 
and self-perception is considered a main tenant of Moscow’s foreign policy at large.    
The main objective of post-Cold War US strategy has been to maintain the tenants 
of a unipolar global order dominated by Washington. However, the current global 
structure is best described not as unipolar, but as a multilateral world structure with the 
US as a hegemon (MacHaffie, 2011). In a multipolar global structure with a hegemon, it 
is possible and likely that a state, or group of states, will emerge to compete or balance 
against the existing hegemon. As mentioned in earlier chapters, the end of the Cold War 
and the confrontation with the Soviet Union required Washington to reposition its foreign 
policy, shifting its geostrategic attention from Europe to the Middle East and Asia. 
Undertaking this shift meant facing new challenges for global and regional preeminence, 
driven by struggles to dominate the sources and flow of natural resources (Vuving, 2007). 
From a defensive realist theoretical framework, balancing power and balancing threat are 
two major reasons that drive states to form alliances. Being a powerful state and a 
powerful threat, the US provides both Russia and China with an incentive to align with 
each other.  
While the previous chapter focused on the rise of China and its role in balancing 
American power, this chapter examines the rise of Russia and the elements of foreign 
policy that compel Moscow to build an alliance with China to balance American power. 
The chapter will first assess the nature of Sino-Russian relations and the overlapping 
security and economic interests that enable mutual cooperation between Moscow and 
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Beijing. It will then evaluate Russian interests in the Middle East by focusing on relations 
with Iran and Syria to understand the region’s strategic importance to Russia in terms of 
balancing American power and influence.  
 
4.2. Domestic Struggles and Foreign Policy: 
A potent foreign policy is not always a reflection of a state’s domestic 
capabilities. Despite having an active foreign policy that, along with China, balanced 
against American influence and hegemony in the Middle East, Putin is facing a number 
of domestic struggles. Lilia Shevtsova suggests that Russia’s personalized power system 
that was shaped by Stalin and endured several “political plastic surgeries” under 
succeeding leaders until Putin, is already beginning to decay (Shevtsova, 2012). Decay, 
according to Shevtsova, is an outcome of the lack of structural changes within the system 
that was propagated by succeeding ruling elites that created an illusion of change through 
shammed elections. Justifying a complete control over society by portraying the outside 
world as hostile is no longer a viable strategy. The standoff between Putin’s regime and 
the population comes at a critical time for Russia. Domestic struggles could theoretically 
hamper Putin’s aspirations to reestablish Russia as a global power. However, Moscow’s 
regional alliances with states like China, Iran, and Syria, are successfully allowing the 
regime to separate domestic troubles from foreign policy ambitions. Most importantly, 
Moscow’s alliances constitute a support for Putin to rest on and keep the domestic front 
in check, while maneuvering suavely internationally.    
Alliances have constantly played a significant role in states obtaining and 
preserving power, security, and status globally and domestically (MacHaffie, 2011). In 
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this respect, Moscow’s assertive foreign policy and its strategic alliances with China, 
Iran, and Syria, are overshadowing domestic struggles that threaten to undermine 
Russia’s resurgence. Thus, Russian foreign policy needs to be considered as a major 
strength for Moscow. Russia is gradually recovering the elements of power that 
reestablish it as a key regional and global actor. This allows the Kremlin to conduct a 
more assertive foreign policy that pursues great power ambitions. Russia’s objective 
remains to recuperate the capabilities of a great power. Reaching this goal requires 
achieving economic recovery, larger integration in the international economy, and the 
creation of “soft security coalitions in Europe and Eurasia” (Tsygankov, 2010). Moscow 
understands that, to be engaged globally, it has to develop the military and economic 
capabilities of great powers to be able to survive among them. These capabilities will 
allow Russia to secure its borders, protect its sovereignty, and address challenges in 
regions such as Eurasia, central Asia, and the Middle East. Russia will have to exploit its 
advantages in sectors such as energy, military affairs, and membership in international 
organizations. The Kremlin partially overcame problems generated by the Soviet 
disintegration, such as loss of territory and a grave economic breakdown, through the 
development of a long term foreign policy aimed at recovering and preserving Russia’s 
great power status and influence in global affairs (Tsygankov, 2010).  
Russia’s recovery takes three important dimensions: economic recovery, social 
recovery, and capitalization on significant power resources. First, and since the late 
1990s, Russia began to recover its economic power with significant increases in its global 
share of GDP and GDP per capita (Young, 2010). Up until 2007, Russia has achieved 
economic growth at a continuous rate of about 7 percent a year, and the size of the 
52 
 
economy grew from $200 billion to $1.3 trillion between 1999 and 2007 (Tsygankov, 
2010, p. 45). Second, the social aspect of recovery is reflected by the growth of the 
middle class to constitute 25 percent of the Russian population in 2008 (Middle class 
grows atop, 2008). This aspect is of foremost importance as it prevents internal 
destabilization and allows Russia to conduct an active foreign policy (Tsygankov, 2010). 
Third, recovery is also based on Russia’s oil and gas reserves. In 2006, it was reported 
that Russia possessed roughly 34 percent of the world’s gas reserves, and 13 percent of 
its oil reserves, and produced 12 percent of the world’s prime energy resources (Arbatov, 
Belova, & Feygin, 2006). Increases in the prices of gas and oil grant Russia substantial 
power due to high demand in markets such as Europe.  
The recovery of state and power capabilities allows Moscow to conduct an 
assertive foreign policy. For example, the leadership in Moscow successfully engaged 
influential states such as China and Iran on issues of common concern, namely security in 
Central Asia and areas adjacent to Russia, and challenges posed by Islamist 
fundamentalism. Moscow cooperated with the US against the Taliban and in the war 
against Islamist fundamentalism (Kreutz, Winter 2002, p. 54). Russia has never been 
colonized by a Western power and maintains a political and spiritual independence from 
the West (Poe, 2003). This sense of independence has allowed Russia to preserve its 
ambition for regional and global influence. Being a large country with vast borders and 
abundant natural resources that create vulnerability due to multiple security challenges, 
Russia developed a greatly centralized political system that enables prompt response to 
foreign threats (Tsygankov, 2010). 
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The Kremlin has been able to challenge great powers such as the US to 
acknowledge Russia’s resurgence and influence in global affairs. This can be deduced 
from Russia’s role in the ongoing Syrian crisis in which it still manages to contain 
American ambitions and sustain the Assad regime. Furthermore, at the top of Putin’s 
assertive foreign policy agenda is the exploitation of growing energy prices and the 
capitalization on Russia’s natural gas and oil reserves to advance a plan for international 
economic expansion. In order to reinforce sovereignty and independence in Russia, 
expansion will be selective and managed by a strong nationalistic leadership (Tsygankov, 
2010, p. 46). Accordingly, the Kremlin has engaged in long-term contracts with European 
markets that constitute 50 percent of Russia’s foreign trade, and increased its arms sales 
abroad to states such as China, India, Venezuela, Algeria, Syria, and Malaysia 
(Tsygankov, 2010, p. 47).  
 
4.3. The Sino-Russian Alliance:  
Relations between Russia and China go back to 1689, when they signed the 
Treaty of Nerchinsk that delineated the borders between the two states. Other treaties 
followed in 1727 and 1858 that further delineated borders and allowed Russia to open a 
language school in the Chinese capital. Following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, 
Moscow showed signs of sympathy toward states they considered victims of Western 
imperialism, and China was one of them. Later in 1921, the Chinese Communist Party 
was established. It was supported by the Soviet Union intellectually and militarily during 
its internal conflict with the Chinese Nationalists. A Russo-Chinese split emerged under 
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the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev due to the latter’s attempts to de-Stalinize the Soviet 
Union, and his policy of rapprochement toward the US.  
Despite concerns about this rapprochement, China’s main concern was de-
Stalinization as Mao favored an ideology of pure socialism over Khrushchev’s 
international socialism. Khrushchev alienated China by, for example, denying it nuclear 
technology due to fears from the emergence of a powerful Chinese leadership, driven by 
a strong army and ideology. The split continued under that of Leonid Brezhnev due to 
disagreements about the demarcation of borders and Russian fears for Chinese mass 
migration to the scarcely populated Russian Far East region, rich with natural and energy 
resources. However, positive relations resumed between Russia and China after the end 
of the Cold War, mainly due to China’s economic revival, and are currently still 
developing on security and economic levels (MacHaffie, 2011).  
Moscow perceives and defines its enemies, friends, policies, and national interests 
as largely based on the notion of fear. Russian foreign policy has been affected by deep-
rooted anti-Western sentiment and fear of the West. Having focused on fear of the West, 
the process of self-identification in Russia has created a social anxiety that vilifies the 
US, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and other political groups in 
Western countries. In recent years, fear of Islamic fundamentalism has emerged as a 
primary concern for Russian society and policymakers. China, on the other hand, was 
never really considered to be a source of threat (Curanović, 2012).  
As mentioned in the first and third chapters, balancing American power needs to 
be examined within the framework of international and regional alliances. Consequently, 
the focus in the thesis is on China and Russia as rising powers capable of disrupting 
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America’s unipolarity. They have overlapping security and economic interests, such as 
maintaining stability in Central Asia due to the vitality of energy supplies to their 
economies, and fighting against ethnic separatism supported by Islamic fundamentalism 
(Weitz, 2012, p. 72). While China is heading toward more influence in the global 
economy, Russia is still struggling to properly recover and gain stability (Curanović, p. 
2). Richard Weitz considers that China’s gradual military expansion, and its economic 
infiltration into Central Asia, along with Russia’s political disorders and dependence on a 
mono-economy of energy, can destabilize Sino-Russian relations (Weitz, 2012, p. 71).  
It is gradually becoming apparent that no one state can stand and dominate the 
international system. The US has looked to strengthen its position by forming a strong 
alliance through the NATO, and Russia and China seem to be adopting the same path by 
building economic and security partnerships among each other, and with other peer 
states. However, both Russia and China share joint interests and objectives in the sphere 
of international relations. Attaining those objectives requires collaboration between 
Moscow and Beijing, allowing them to complement each other in terms of strengths and 
weaknesses. Russia and China are aligning with each other due to shared interests. 
Beyond being neighbors with shared borders, they both qualify as great powers with large 
militaries, both have similar regimes, and frequently find themselves in conflict with the 
US (MacHaffie, 2011).  
Russia and China have previously signed a number of economic and political 
agreements. They agreed to expand their joint military collaboration. These agreements 
reflect a unified stance by Moscow and Beijing on several key issues like Asia-Pacific 
security, Iran’s nuclear program, and the ongoing Syrian crisis, which suggests that 
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Russo-Chinese relations are at their peak (Weitz, 2012, p. 71). Since the fall of the Soviet 
Union, Russia and China have worked closely to overcome existing tensions. Moscow 
and Beijing have improved their relations gradually by settling border disputes, 
establishing a framework for cross-border cooperation, and worked jointly to control 
illegal migration (Curanović, p. 2). Beyond shared economic interests related to ensuring 
primacy over the production and flow of natural resources, Moscow and Beijing have 
continuously affirmed their desire to strengthen the rule of law globally, theoretically at 
least, and promote equality and multilateralism between states (Razov, 2012). Those 
components explain their involvement – covertly in the case of China – in the Middle 
East generally, and their close ties with Iran and Syria.  
 
4.3.1. The Premises of Alliance: 
One of the major premises of realism in international relations is that states seek 
to obtain power in order to defend their interests and security in the global system. 
MacHaffie posits that alliance-building is an effective way for major powers to pursue 
this goal (MacHaffie, 2011). As established in the third chapter of the thesis, China 
currently stands as an influential power globally. Despite not fostering enduring alliances 
in the past, MacHaffie argues that China has deepened its cooperation with Russia. From 
a structural and defensive realist approach, Russia and China are likely to form a military 
alliance to balance against the US as a powerful state and a potential threat to their 
interests in their respective spheres of influence.  
Whether the US constitutes an actual military threat to both Russia and China is 
irrelevant. The Sinno-Russian vision is based on the perception that US military strength 
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and policies to promote democracy constitutes a threat to established norms and traditions 
in both countries. Therefore, both Russia and China need each other as allies to counter 
American influence in their areas of interest such as the Middle East, Central Asia, and 
the Caucasus. For example, Central Asia is a region of foremost geostrategic importance 
to both Russia and China. Both countries share commercial, national security, and 
geopolitical interests in that region, and cooperate together to prevent other great powers 
from meddling in Central Asian affairs (Chen, 2012). 
Russian and Chinese interest in Central Asia stems from the region’s abundance 
in natural resources. Russia has traditionally considered Central Asia as a sphere of 
influence, essential to balance against the US and other European powers, notably after 
the 9/11 attacks, when the US sought to strengthen its military presence in Central Asia. 
In turn, China’s dependence on foreign countries in term of energy supply has increased 
significantly in recent years, making energy protection in Central Asia a strategic choice 
for China. Russia accepted the diffusion of Chinese capital in Central Asia, considering 
China as a valuable ally to balance against American influence in the region. Both 
nations institutionalized cooperation by launching the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization as a regional cooperation and safety framework (Chen, 2012). 
 
4.4. Russia and the Middle East: 
Addressing the theme of the thesis requires a narrower understanding of Russian 
foreign policy that concentrates on a specific region like the Middle East. Russia’s 
engagement in the Middle East is driven by three dimensions that pertain to Moscow’s 
domestic and international challenges. The first basis of intervention is domestic. It 
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revolves around the need to respond to dangers posed by the threat of secessionism in the 
North Caucasus and the repercussions that might arise from a possible radicalization of 
Russian Muslims. The second basis of intervention relates to economic interests in the 
region. Economic interests in the Middle East focus on established partnerships with Iran 
and Syria, but also aim to create and strengthen trading relations with America’s allies in 
the region. The final dimension of intervention is conditioned by geopolitical factors that 
include Moscow’s competition with the West and its desire to reassert itself 
internationally as a dependable great power that supports and sustains international norms 
and laws (Dannreuther, 2009).    
 
4.4.1. Premises of Russian Interest in the Middle East: 
Throughout history, the quest for warm water ports has been a trend in the 
shaping of Russian foreign policy, namely in regions such as the Middle East. Russia’s 
policy toward, and its links with, the region and the Islamic world, can be traced back to 
1677 when, and until 1917, consecutive Russian Tsars fought several wars with the 
Ottoman Empire to control the Black Sea and Caucasus areas. In fact, Russia has long 
been involved in the Middle East and fostered better relations with Arabs than other 
Western countries did (Kreutz, 2002). As Andrej Kreutz posits, Russia is currently an 
independent and meaningful player in the Middle East, with interest in the broad Middle 
East region that includes Turkey, Iran, the Arab world, Israel, Transcaucasia, and Central 
Asia. Russia’s interests stem from the geographical proximity of the Middle East to its 
southern border. This factor is of utter importance to Russia as Moscow considers that 
any disturbances in the region, notably those caused by Islamist radicalism and Saudi 
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support for rebels in the Northern Caucasus and Uzbekistan, are capable of causing 
domestic problems in the Russian Federation.  Russia finds more reasons for concern due 
to America’s great presence in the greater Middle East and its human, military, and 
financial investments in Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia 
(Kreutz, 2002).  
Russia’s interest in the Middle East is also driven by economic factors. The USSR 
was one of the major arms suppliers to Arab states in exchange of political and 
ideological preeminence in the 1970s and 1980s. Now, Russia aims to make profit from 
arms sales to the Middle East, and control over the oil in the Caspian Sea and its 
transportation to the West. Despite the end of the Cold War, geopolitical competition in 
the greater Middle East area has not ended and is largely driven by attempts to control 
natural gas and petroleum industries (Barylski, 1995). For that reason, Russian 
policymakers seek to develop better relations and foster cooperation with geographically 
neighboring oil-producing Arab countries. Attempting to exert and maintain influence in 
the region is driven by competition with the US which has substantial regional presence 
in the development of natural gas and petroleum industries (Zoellick & Zelikov, 2000, 
pp. 74-75). Fostering partnerships with oil-producing Arab countries represents an 
attempt to find alternatives for Western clients and economic partners by establishing 
additional networks of customers for Russian industry. Accordingly, Moscow seeks to 
magnify commercial gains by sustaining trade with Iran, developing commerce with 
Kuwait and other Gulf countries, and supporting and protecting Iraq (Kreutz, 2002, pp. 
54-55). 
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 Beyond political and economic interests in the Middle East, cultural factors affect 
Russia’s policies in the region. Despite being mainly Easter Orthodox, fifteen percent of 
Russia’s population consists of Muslims that diverge from other Russians in terms of 
religious traditions, social culture, and political attitudes. This is of particular relevance to 
Russian policymaking due to the conflict in Chechnya and continuous terrorist attacks on 
Russian territory by Islamist radicals.    
Russia’s political, economic, and cultural interests in the Middle East require 
alliance building and the development of perceptive policies. Pavel Baev argues that the 
uprisings in the MENA have affected Russia’s policy orientation, and created new 
opportunities for increasing and consolidating its influence in the region (Baev, 2011). 
Russia reacts to any event that could constitute a threat to its national security and 
interests. Whereas Russia was indifferent toward NATO intervention in Libya against 
Qaddafi, its stance on the Syrian crisis was different. As revolutions have the tendency to 
spread in waves, and given American and Saudi intervention in Syria, Russia fears that 
the trend might spread toward the Caucasus and Central Asia. Several states in both areas 
share similar characteristics to Arab autocracies and are vulnerable and prone to regime 
change (Baev, 2011, p. 16). Therefore, Russian anxiety about instability in the region 
spilling over to neighboring regions justifies Putin’s assertive policy toward Syria. Policy 
success in Syria would grant Moscow more influence in the greater Middle East. Russia’s 
leadership developed its policies in the MENA region in synchrony with China as it 
shares security concerns with Russia. Russian and Chinese foreign policy coordination 
has been reflected in the United Nations as they constantly vetoed Western efforts to 
inflict sanctions on anti-Western regimes. Most notable is the Russo-Chinese common 
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view on Iran’s nuclear program and rejection of Western involvement in the Syrian crisis 
(Weitz, 2012, p. 73). 
 
4.4.2. Russian Policy toward Iran: 
Since assuming power, Putin has made the Middle East an area of central and 
increasing focus in his foreign policy strategies. In 2000, Putin declared that his policy 
strategy toward the Middle East will revolve around restoring and strengthening Russia’s 
position in the region, particularly its economic posture (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Russia, 2000). Putin’s attention to the region is driven by his ambitions to balance 
American power, notably through strong alliances with Iran and Syria, and cope with the 
Chechen threat and Islamist terrorism at home. Putin’s regime considers the conflict with 
Chechnya a significant threat to Russian security and territorial integrity given the 
Chechen leadership’s infiltration by foreign jihadists (Khrestin & Elliott, 2007). As noted 
by Igor Khrestin and John Elliott, Putin’s stance on Islamist terrorism unfolds into several 
stages that include cooperation with the US on the broader war on terror, Putin’s request 
to join the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in which Russia was granted 
observer status, and alliance building with Iran. 
Moscow’s consistent attempts to support Tehran and develop its relations with 
succeeding Iranian leaders aim at achieving three objectives related to preventing threats 
and pursuing interests: upsetting Washington, advancing and protecting Russian 
influence in the Middle East and Syria, and addressing the threat of Islamist terrorism at 
home. Russo-Iranian relations started to develop in 1989 and resulted in several military 
and energy deals that saw Russian companies build two nuclear reactors at Bushehr 
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(Khrestin & Elliott, 2007). Iran’s nuclear program is not a source of problems between 
Iran and the US, but between Russia and the US as well. Divergence in policy toward 
Iran dates back to the Yeltsin presidency when Russian and the US were cooperating in 
different areas except in Iran to whom Moscow the primary supplier of arms and nuclear 
technology, against Washington’s will (Freedman, 2003, p. 74).  Russia and Iran have 
strongly established roots of regional and global bilateral cooperation related to mutual 
interests. Regional cooperation included joint attempts to sustain the cease fire in 
Tajikistan, support the Northern Alliance in battles again the Taliban in Afghanistan, and 
backing Armenia against Azerbaijan in order to prevent the latter from gaining influence 
in the Transcaucasia. Globally, both Iran and Russia allied against American unipolarity 
(Freedman, 2003). Despite having bumpy relations at times such as Russia’s invasion of 
Chechnya under Putin, Tehran downplayed problems due to the need to preserve its 
alliance Moscow to counterbalance Washington diplomatically.  
Despite accusations alleging that Iran’s nuclear program was primarily military, 
Russia’s foreign ministry has persistently maintained that the program was and still is 
conducted in line with established international norms. Putin has established energy trade 
with Iran, supported Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, and shielded the Iranian government 
from Western pressure. Fostering good relations with Iran is Putin’s strategy to keep it 
from interfering in Chechnya and other Islamist matters that are considered to be threats 
to Russia. The agreement between Moscow and Tehran on this issue is of high 
significance due to Iran’s geographical proximity to troubled areas in Russia’s south. In 
this regard, it is notable to mention that Syria also supported Russia’s stance against 
Islamist fundamentalism diplomatically in 2005 by welcoming the election of pro-Putin 
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Alu Alkhanov as president of Chechnya (Khrestin & Elliott, 2007). Iran has long 
cooperated with Russia to develop a sustainable energy strategy that would establish it as 
a valued regional actor. This undertaking faces several obstacles related to differences in 
opinions between Moscow and Tehran on issues related to Islamic institutionalism and 
ethnical and racial differences in Central Asia and Caucasia. However, attempts by 
Europe and the US to disrupt Russo-Iranian collaboration in the field of energy and 
economy resources in the Middle East establishes the ground for more cooperation to 
frustrate Euro-American attempts to dominate an area of high geopolitical significance 
(Simbar, 2011).  
Cooperation between Russia and Iran, joined by China, extends to the ongoing 
Syrian crisis. Russia and China vetoed resolutions in the Security Council on Syria that 
requested immediate action to topple the Assad regime. Efforts to overthrow the Assad 
regime by the US and its European and Arab allies are aimed at breaking the rejectionist 
camp by defanging Iran’s most active ally outside Venezuela (Williams, 2012). 
Washington’s quest to create a pro-US ‘New Middle East’, weaker and more vulnerable 
to external intervention justifies its policy toward the Syrian crisis. This ‘New Middle 
East’ project intensified rejectionism from Iran, Syria, Hamas in Palestine, and most 
importantly Hezbollah in Lebanon. This project reflects a shift in US foreign policy in the 
region that coincides with that of Israel. Both Rice and Olmert had publically revealed, in 
2006, American-Israeli intentions to launch a ‘New Middle East’ project. This project 
constituted a “military roadmap” that consists of the creation of an “arc of instability, 
chaos, and violence extending from Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria to Iraq, the Persian 
Gulf, Iran, and the borders of NATO-garrisoned Afghanistan” (Nazemroaya, 2006). US 
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Army Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Peters contended that redesigning the Middle East’s 
borders would constitute an essential solution to the region’s problems, as seen by 
Washington, adding that the process could consist of necessary pains for the people of the 
Middle East (Peters, 2006). 
Regional power and politics are now focused on the Persian Gulf due to Iran’s 
ascendance in terms of power and influence in the Middle East. The threat of 
confrontation between the US and Iran magnifies the importance of Iran’s non-state allies 
(Fischer, 2008). Hezbollah’s close ties with Iran and Syria grant Lebanon the upper hand 
in strategic issues related to the broader Arab Israeli conflict and the Palestine cause. 
Also, Israel itself has always been anxious about Hezbollah’s alliance with Syria and 
Iran. The Lebanese resistance has enhanced the “spirit of resistance” in the Middle East, 
while exposing Israel’s military shortcomings following both military defeats in May 
2000 and July 2006 (Baroud, 2006). This status quo makes Washington’s political 
maneuvers nearly impossible without appeasing Iran and its allies, particularly Syria and 
Hezbollah. Israel has never hidden its solid alliance with Washington. Shabtai Shavit, a 
national security advisor to the Knesset, affirmed the contiguity of US and Israeli 
interests (Buncombe, 2006). Those specific interests revolve around a strategic objective 
to break up the Syria-Lebanon front and reduce Iran’s influence as reflected by its 
alliance with Hezbollah (Baroud, 2006). 
Accordingly, Washington’s intervention in the Syrian conflict is motivated by its 
desire to undermine Iran by toppling its most significant ally in the Arab region, which 
would also have repercussions on Hezbollah in Lebanon (Margolis, 2012). The US and 
its allies have been feeding rebels in Syria with arms, money, intelligence information, 
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and diplomatic support to topple the Assad regime. Behind America’s intervention in the 
Syrian lies influence from Israel, a state that has considerable political pressure on 
Washington’s policies in the Middle East.  Israeli leaders consider that a destabilized 
Syria is a source of many benefits to Israel. They believe that toppling Assad would 
significantly undermine Iran, their main regional rival, frustrate Syrian efforts to regain 
the Golan Heights, and finally cripple Hezbollah and Palestinian resistance factions 
(Margolis, 2012). This magnifies dissension between Russia, China, and Iran on one 
hand, and the US and its Western European allies on the other (Watts, 2012).  
 
4.4.3. Russian Policy toward Syria: 
Russia and Syria have long been trading partners, with ties that date back to the 
Soviet era, establishing a sustained military and economic alliance. China can also have a 
significant role in the process, being one of Syria’s largest trading partners (Zakaria, 
2012). While Zakaria argues that Russia’s economic and political alliance with Syria is 
weak and limited, it is noteworthy to mention that Syria constitutes a highly important 
asset to Russia’s current foreign policy due to its geostrategic significance in relation to 
oil and gas routes. This argument is demonstrated by Moscow’s stance during the Syrian 
crisis, which resulted in two vetoes in the Security Council, preventing action against the 
Assad regime. 
Russia remains Syria’s largest arms provider. Russia’s involvement in the Middle 
East, and Syria specifically, goes beyond trade partnerships. It is based on the rise of 
fundamentalist multinational jihadi groups and Russia’s desire to promote and protect its 
interests in the region. The Syrian crisis embodies Moscow’s quintessential fears of 
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Islamic radicalism that has emerged among armed rebels, given its continuous struggles 
with fundamentalist groups in border areas and southern regions (Zakaria, 2012). Should 
it want to persuade Moscow to abandon Assad, Washington needs to address those fears 
tangibly. The conflict in Syria and Russia’s intervention in the crisis underlie Moscow’s 
belief that events in the Middle East and the Gulf have repercussions on Russia and its 
immediate neighbors. The leadership in Moscow believes that certain Middle Eastern 
states, namely Saudi Arabia, have an undeniable influence on, and role in promoting 
Islamic radicalization in the Caucasus (Kreutz, 2002, p. 52).  
Saudi support for “Wahhabite” rebels in the Northern Caucasus and Uzbekistan’s 
Ferghana valley has deteriorated relations between Moscow and Riyadh (Gresh, 1998). 
Despite official denial by Saudi Arabia of intervention in the crisis, Moscow believes that 
the source of problems in Chechnya lies in the presence among rebels of radicalized 
mercenaries from Arab countries, fighting for power and money (Kreutz, 2002, p. 53). 
Moscow and Riyadh remain tacit allies as they both seek to maintain high world oil 
prices, but Russia retains reservations against Saudi Arabia as it considers it a chief 
funder for Chechen rebels (Freedman, 2003). Thus, Russia’s intervention in the Syrian 
crisis indicates a broader struggle with Saudi Arabia and other states that, according to 
Russian authorities, support Islamist radicals that threaten Russian national security and 
sovereignty.  
The crisis in Syria cannot be brought to an end without a negotiated agreement 
that includes Russia and China. Adopting a path that favors the triumph of armed rebels 
in Syria will further alienate Moscow and Beijing against Washington, and possibly 
produce a phase of instability that resembles the current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
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The current crisis poses several concerns and challenges related to the capability of the 
Syrian opposition to govern, establish security, and prevent sectarian retaliations in Syria. 
Involving Russia in a negotiated solution to the crisis will address these challenges due to 
friendly relations with the Assad regime, and Moscow’s eagerness to preserve and 
develop its military and commercial dealings with Syria (Simes & Saunders , 2012).  
Furthermore, the development and implementation of Russian foreign policy in 
recent years has revolved around principles of soft power and human security. Russian 
diplomats have constantly argued against the use of military coercion in foreign policy, 
favoring soft power methods as ultimate tools to pursue and protect national interests 
(Solovyev, 2011). Like any influential power, Russia’s political dialogue is based on self-
interests and can be duplicitous. In spite of acting coercively in areas of direct influence 
such as the Baltics where its interests are threated, Moscow favors a multilateral global 
system in which the UN and the Security Council preserve world peace and a balance of 
power internationally (Curanović, 2012, p. 2). Russia’s keenness for diplomacy should 
therefore be explored fully by the US in Syria and other regions of conflict such as the 
Caucasus.  
Moscow is known to be skeptical about US activity in the Middle East and the 
post-Soviet region. In 2007, Vladimir Putin explicitly criticized the Pax Americana by 
describing it as a threat to global peace. He asserted that this threat needs to be balanced 
by cooperation between Russia, China, and India (Curanović, 2012, p. 3). In September 
2013, Putin addressed the American people and their leaders directly through an op-ed in 
the New York Times. His letter expressed frustration with American policies in the 
Middle East, namely Syria, but also revealed anxiety about threats to Russian national 
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security as a result of such policies. Putin stated that international security has to, and can 
only be preserved by the United Nations Security Council (Putin, 2013). He attacked the 
US for acting unilaterally, and implicitly warned Washington against bypassing UN 
regulations to take military action in Syria without authorization from the Security 
Council. Putin’s concern about the conflict spreading beyond Syria’s border as a result of 
a potential US military strike exceeds that about attempts to resolve Iran’s nuclear 
problem and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It exposes Russian fears of instability in the 
region that could affect Russia directly. Putin’s main fear is driven by the presence of 
radicalized al-Qaeda, Islamist fundamentalists, and Arab mercenaries fighting in Syria, 
and who could be manipulated into attacking Russian territory. 
Russia’s confrontation with the US is not limited to the Middle East, and extends 
to the Caucasus. This confrontation draws back to the armed conflict between Russia and 
Georgia over South Ossetia in 2008, after Washington helped overthrow the existing 
Georgian government to establish a US-backed administration led by Mikhail 
Shakashvilli (Margolis, 2012). A similar pattern emerged again in the Caucasus due to 
the dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, with both 
countries being backed by Washington and Moscow respectively. As Eric Margolis 
reports, Russo-American relations are further deteriorated by US plans to install a missile 
defense shield in Eastern Europe (Margolis, 2012).  
 
4.5. Conclusion: 
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, newly independent central 
Asian countries started to receive considerable attention from great powers due to their 
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geostrategic position and abundance in energy and resource reserves. As neighboring 
countries with considerable interest in the region, Russia and China developed 
commercial and national security partnerships to prevent other great powers from 
wielding leverage over Central Asia (Chen, 2012). These partnerships were further 
strengthened by the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that reveals 
the shared interests of Russia and China to preserve security in Central Asia, cooperate in 
mutual defense strategies, and expand mutual energy cooperation in the region.  
States do not need to be in harmony on every level to become allies, and previous 
tensions between Russia and China do not prevent the formation of an alliance between 
them. Moscow and Beijing share mutual geopolitical and economic interests, and under 
the leadership of Putin, Sino-Russian relations will continue to develop moderately as the 
Russian president is keen to preserve strong relations with Beijing. The Russia 
government will seek to attract Chinese investment to vitalize and improve the Russian 
economy. 
Beyond building partnerships with China to balance American power and threat 
in Asia, Russia also focuses on alliance building in the Middle East. Russia’s intervention 
in the Middle East goes beyond mere geopolitical interests and competition over natural 
resources. This intervention comes as a result of a broad strategic framework that has 
three dimensions. The first dimension is related to Russia’s domestic political context and 
the threat posed by separatism and terrorism. By intervening in the Middle East, Moscow 
intends to stabilize the Russian domestic front by thwarting the threat of secessionism 
arising from the North Caucasus, and reduce the effect of Islamist radicalization on its 
Muslim population. The second dimension relates to economic interests that are deemed 
70 
 
essential to the reestablishment Russia’s great power status. To serve this purpose, Russia 
focuses on energy trade with Iran, fostering strong relations with Syria to protect its 
domestic front, as well as economic and political relations with pro-Western countries 
like Israel, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia (Dannreuther, 2012, p. 558). The third dimension 
revolves around geopolitical interests in the region. Russia’s alliances in the Middle East 
provide Moscow with leverage to balance American power and prevent Western hostile 
policies toward Russia. Most importantly, Moscow looks at preserving its influence as a 
key player in the Middle East by helping Assad survive, and having a say in a possible 
post-Assad Syria. It is important to mention that Moscow’s resurgence in the Middle East 
was and is still facilitated by imbalanced US policies in the region.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
 
5.1. General Findings: 
At times of global political, economic, and security changes, in which unipolarity 
is no longer possible, this thesis examined the theme of American decline and the rise of 
China and Russia as potential competitors from a defensive realist theoretical framework. 
It concluded that one power alone cannot disrupt American hegemony. American 
dominance can only be unsettled by a coalition of powerful and influential states, and 
hence this thesis focused on China and Russia as America’s main competitors. It argued 
that despite America’s decline in terms of economy and influence, China and Russia 
alone are not ready to displace it and assume the title of competitors. They are both 
capable of balancing American influence regionally in areas of political and economic 
interest, such a Central Asia and the Middle East, and within the framework of strategic 
geopolitical alliances. Hegemony as witnessed since the end of the Cold War is no longer 
applicable globally. The theory that every hegemon will ultimately be challenged is 
currently materializing as other global actors are emerging to balance against power, 
threat, or both simultaneously. Accordingly, discourse in the realm of international affairs 
is shifting away from hegemony toward multipolarity and the need for collaboration 
between the US and other emerging powers such as China and Russia. 
Successive wars against Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respectively have 
triggered American decline. Both wars were followed by a devastating economic crisis 
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that started in the US and spread across the world. The crisis proved to be most damaging 
to the American economy due to large defense spending to finance wars and other covert 
interventions abroad. The thesis found that American decline can neither be proved nor 
disproved due to the lack of conclusive evidence. However, it showed that American 
influence is gradually decreasing in regions such as the Middle East.  It determined that 
the US does possess the tools to act unilaterally anymore. In order to preserve a 
respectable global status, leaders in Washington should develop new strategies that 
reposition American foreign policy to fit with emerging global dynamics. America’s new 
foreign policy should disregard coercion as a means of pursuing interests, and rather aim 
to foster collaboration with emerging powers through global multilateral institutions.  
America’s economic troubles coincided with China’s economic growth. At a time 
when the US was waging wars, China was developing prudent long-term policies that 
allowed for steady growth in terms of wealth and power, and established it as a player 
with substantial international influence. Chinese policies revolve around two convictions. 
First, they acknowledge that at this point in time China cannot challenge American 
hegemony alone. Second, they believe that American decline is inevitable, which requires 
patience and the development of strategic alliances that would fill the void when 
American hegemony crumbles. Accordingly, China will focus its attention on ensuring 
continuous economic growth. It will look to translate growth into political and military 
power, and wait to capitalize on America’s mistakes. China will also seek to balance 
American threat and influence through alliance-building in areas of geopolitical 
significance. Washington is currently redirecting its attention from the Middle East 
toward Asia. The thesis determined that the US cannot contain or deter China by 
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aggression and coercion. It can only do so by reviving its economy and developing 
frameworks for negotiations based on shared interests and existing economic relations, 
while preserving self-defense strategies as potential deterrence methods.  
Balancing against America prompts China to develop alliances with states such 
Russia and Iran that reject US hegemony and seek to tame its power and influence, at 
least regionally. Russia is working toward reviving its global power status, more so under 
the leadership of Putin. By fostering relations with China and Iran, it is looking to 
preserve its interests and influence in Central Asia and the Middle East, and protect its 
national security from Islamist fundamentalism. Despite domestic struggles in Russia that 
could undermine the Kremlin’s ambitions to revive the state as an influential actor 
internationally and regionally, Putin seems to be succeeding in containing domestic 
struggles by leading an active foreign policy. Russia is steadily recovering the elements 
of power that characterize and fit the ambitions of great powers through economic and 
military recovery, greater integration in the international economy, and strategic alliance-
building.  
Unlike its stance toward the West, Russia has never considered China as a 
substantial source of threat. Despite tensions in past relations, both Moscow and Beijing 
share intersecting economic and security interests related to natural resources, 
maintaining stability in Central Asia, and suppressing ethnic separatism. The thesis 
established that both states are likely to ally to balance against US power and threat to 
their interests in their respective spheres of influence. Security and economic cooperation 
between Russia and China allows them to capitalize on their strengths and overcome their 
weaknesses. But beyond this, both states share a rhetoric that reveals a greater ambition 
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to consolidate the rule of international law, and promote multilateralism and greater 
equality among states. Russian and Chinese interests in Central Asia are based on the 
region’s abundance in natural resources. Dominating the region will allow them to ward 
off US and European attempts to stop their economic progress. The area is of foremost 
significance to China due to its dependence on foreign sources of energy supply.  
In the Middle East, Russia’s alliance with Iran and intervention in Syria comes as 
a direct response to the threat of radical Islamists backed by the US and its allies, namely 
Saudi Arabia. They represent Moscow’s attempt to assert itself as an influential power in 
the region and protect its domestic front from foreign threats. This is the underlying 
factor behind Russia’s continuous attempts to foster good relations with states such as 
Iran, Turkey, Israel, Kuwait, and other oil-producing Arab countries. Furthermore, the 
Middle East provides Russia with ample resources through arms trade, with states such as 
Iran and Syria, which provide considerable support to the Russian economy.  
 
5.2. From Pax Pacifica to Pax Economica: 
Sino-American relations look to be heading toward normalization in Asia. Several 
encouraging signs indicate that Asian countries will rebuff divergence in favor of 
cooperation. China, Japan, and South Korea have agreed to initiate negotiations about a 
trilateral free-trade agreement later in 2012. That agreement will represent a qualitative 
leap for Asia, as it will institutionalize economic cooperation in the region. If 
successfully concluded, such an agreement – comprising the world’s second, third, and 
twelfths largest economies – will put Northeast Asia on par with, if not above, the EU 
and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The agreement will present a 
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higher degree of regional economic integration and could potentially prove to be of 
greater importance to the global economy (Young-kwan, 2012). The establishment of a 
trilateral agreement between China, Japan, and South Korea is likely to produce a 
momentum effect that could eventually incorporate the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) and other countries – Australia, New Zealand, and India – into the 
group. 
 This agreement will likely relax Sino-American tensions by enhancing economic 
cooperation between the US and Asia. In response to such an agreement, Washington 
would attempt to improve the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), and seek to 
promote a unified Asia-Pacific economic community by urging Japan to join the TPP. It 
is unlikely that Japan will decline Washington’s request due to strategic motives. Hence, 
Japan and South Korea will likely attempt to find or create channels to connect a “Sino-
centric Asia and a US-centered Pacific” (Young-kwan, 2012). The fulfillment of regional 
integration and economic cooperation could in theory stabilize political disputes among 
Asian countries, and translate into a form of international integration, on the basis of 
economic cooperation, establishing peace and soothing Sino-American political tensions. 
However, building a framework for regional and international peace – starting from a Pax 
Pacifica and leading to a Pax Economica – will  likely be a lengthy process, and will 
necessitate the presence of respected visionaries, as well as extensive political  support 
from all states. The momentum for regional and international peace will only be possible 
through the creation of small functional institutions that will constitute the backbone of a 
global institution for cooperation in the future. 
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 This, however, remains a theory to be tested. Despite Asia’s remarkable speed 
and scale of economic development, many serious challenges could possibly hinder the 
region’s success. Those challenges are often overlooked due to the concentration on 
economic troubles in the US and Europe (Chellaney, 2012). Asia must handle several 
obstacles revolving around territorial and maritime disputes, overzealous nationalism, 
rising religious extremism, historically-rooted conflicts, and aggressive resource 
competition over water and energy. Asia’s political integration and the creation of a 
security framework have been shadowed by economic integration. Accordingly, political 
and economic integration would be two interdependent processes that ought to be 
addressed jointly within a comprehensive framework for integration. Asia could unite and 
mold a new world order only if it combines its Western-oriented economic values with 
Western political values (Chellaney, 2012).  
 
5.3. A Look at the Future: 
Russia’s assertive stance in the Syrian crisis, and its support to the Assad regime, 
indicates that American influence in the region may be gradually declining. Moscow’s 
policy in Syria is driven by its desire to advance and protect Russian influence and 
interests in the Middle East. These interests are related to natural gas and oil resources, as 
well as fighting Islamist fundamentalist to ensure the protection of Russian national 
security.  
President George W. Bush’s greatest achievement in terms of US Middle East 
policy was destabilizing the region. However, Washington’s assumed outcome of a pro-
Western Middle East is yet to be attained. A newer Middle East is currently emerging, 
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one that appears to be more responsive to popular demands for reform. However, it is 
also marked by a decline in the permeability of Arab politics to transnational political 
influences. This leaves room for large influence from international actors, such as the US 
and Russia, who will likely play a substantial role in determining the future of the region. 
Both Washington and Russia will jointly tailor the new Middle East to fit their interests, 
with an upper hand for the latter. The current status quo in the Middle East is a clear 
reflection of US limitations and Russian gains in terms of power and influence in the 
region. Popular uprisings across the Middle East produced serious complications for US 
diplomacy, altered US foreign policy priorities, and temporarily impeded the 
implementation of the ‘New Middle East’ project.  
Washington will undoubtedly make certain concessions with regard to previous 
taboos – such as its position toward Islamists – at the benefit of preserving its interests. 
Washington could arguably be attempting to promote and produce a new form of “Arab 
moderation” in which new regimes would be more reflective of popular demands for 
reform, but still dependent on US foreign political, economic, and security agendas. In 
turn, Moscow will look to support the Assad regime, and ensure to play in role in 
determining the outcome of a post-Assad Syria should Assad be toppled. It will also seek 
to strengthen its alliance with Iran, and foster new alliances with oil-producing Arab 
countries that would be beneficial economically in terms of energy trade, and politically 
in terms of warding off the threat of Islamist terrorism.  
Despite tensions between the US and China on one hand, and the US and Russia 
on the other, the world seems to be heading toward multipolarity and collaboration. New 
global dynamics of power are emerging, and states are acknowledging that preserving 
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their interests can no longer be achieved by aggression and coercion. The economic crisis 
is compelling states to reduce defense spending and focus on collaboration to resolve 
matters related to shared geostrategic interests. History always repeats itself. Therefore, 
what is likely to happen in the near future is the elaboration by great powers of new 
settlements, similar to Sykes-Picot and Yalta agreements, to reorganize certain 
geographical areas such as the Middle East, not geographically, but in terms of spheres of 
influence.    
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